

Copyright

by

Sara Louise Keever

2007

**Superpower Ideology: What a Century of Venezuela in *The New York Times*
Can Tell Us About Ourselves**

by

Sara Louise Keever, B.A.

Thesis

**Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of The University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Master of Arts**

**The University of Texas at Austin
May 2007**

**Superpower Ideology: What a Century of Venezuela in *The New York Times*
Can Tell Us About Ourselves**

APPROVED BY

SUPERVISING COMMITTEE:

Dustin Harp

Robert Jensen

This thesis is dedicated to my parents.

Their unfailing encouragement has always made my destinations seem reachable.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my supervisors, Dr. Dustin Harp and Dr. Robert Jensen, with sincere gratitude. Thanks to their openness, insight and honesty, I am truly proud of this culmination of my studies here at the University of Texas at Austin. In their own ways, they are both rare sources of inspiration that the “impossible” is possible after all.

I would also like to thank Dr. Harry Cleaver and Dr. Kaushik Ghosh for opening my eyes to devastating realms of thought that have provided me with sustained hope and curiosity.

On a more personal note, thanks to Em and Liz for the exchange of friendship, recipes and ideas that made it worthwhile. Finally, I must thank both my mom and Alan for bearing the brunt of my rants and frustrations throughout this learning process and for sometimes getting angry along with me. They are my comrades.

May 4, 2007

ABSTRACT

Superpower Ideology: What a Century of Venezuela in *The New York Times* Can Tell Us About Ourselves

by

Sara Louise Keever, M.A.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2007

SUPERVISOR: Dustin Harp

This thesis explores the role of news discourse in the reproduction of dominant international structures of power by focusing on the case study of Venezuela in *The New York Times* editorials over the course of the twentieth century. As a leading source of international news in the U.S., the *Times* occupies an influential position in disseminating and reproducing understandings of the world and our relationships in it. In this analysis, I look at how *The New York Times* defines, stages and delimits the roles of Venezuela and the U.S. in the international community, and how these constructions of knowledge work discursively to maintain international structures of power. Drawing from a neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony and a postcolonial theoretical perspective of the ideology of modernization, I employ a broad historical approach to the role of the *Times* in this international relationship, finding that the rationality of the editorials often resembles colonialist discourse.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgments	v
Abstract	vi
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION	1
Ideology and Hegemony	3
Discourse Analysis	6
Metaphor in Discourse	8
Venezuela's Political Background	11
Nationalism in the News	16
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW	18
International News in the U.S.	18
Postcolonial Social Theory	21
Journalism and Colonial Discourse	29
CHAPTER THREE: METHOD	47
Approaches to Discourse Analysis	47
Selecting the Articles	49
CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION	51
Delineation Tropes	52
Caricature Tropes	80
Other Tropes	104
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS	109
APPENDIX	119
REFERENCES	126
VITA	132

INTRODUCTION

On April 13, 2002, in response to a military coup against Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, *The New York Times* published an editorial stating: “With yesterday’s resignation of President Hugo Chávez, Venezuelan democracy is no longer threatened by a would-be dictator. Mr. Chávez, a ruinous demagogue, stepped down after the military intervened and handed power to a respected business leader, Pedro Carmona” (“Hugo Chávez Departs,” 2002, p. A16). According to Mark Weisbrot of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, this statement likely constituted “the first time in more than 25 years that they [*The New York Times*] supported a military coup against a democratic government” (Weisbrot & Chávez, 2003). On April 12, however, massive public protest in Venezuela had signaled a refusal among citizens to accept the coup. Democratically-elected Chávez, who had refused to resign, was reinstalled as president the same day this editorial was published.

The U.S. media has long been criticized by concerned scholars and activists for its portrayal of the political situation in Venezuela (e.g. Delacour, 2005). Journalist and Latin American historian Richard Gott (2005) has accused the prestige press of ignoring the rural and poor majority of Venezuelans and instead absorbing a more elite, urban point of view opposed to Chávez and his political reforms. “Rarely,” he has argued, “have political developments in an important country – one of the great oil producers of the Western world – been so inadequately reported and analyzed by the foreign media” (p. 246). In an earlier quantitative framing analysis, I found that, from 2001 to 2005, *The New York Times* systematically excluded frames such as racism, redistribution of resources, disadvantages of international free trade policy, and Venezuelan national

sovereignty, while emphasizing frames such as oil and trade interests, bureaucratic friction, violence, and Communist authoritarianism (Keever, 2005).

In this study, I focus on a different approach to U.S. coverage of Venezuela, delving deeper into the ideological implications of what a Venezuelan lawyer and activist has called “the extreme levels of distortion, lack of fact checking and source verification and outright manipulation of information in the U.S. media on Venezuela” (Golinger, 2007). The central questions in this study are: How does *The New York Times* define, stage and delimit the roles of Venezuela and the U.S. in the international community? How are these constructions of knowledge reproduced or challenged over time? How do they work discursively to maintain international structures of power?

Studies of news media and ideology document the social construction of particular values in the news media with the goal of contributing to a larger, more complex understanding of hegemony. In journalism studies, this area of research has developed into a concept of framing that illuminates the ideological work done by the selection, emphasis and exclusion of frames in the news (Entman, 1993; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Gitlin, 1980; Reese, et al., 2001). One difficulty with the concept of framing, however, is how to conduct an ideological study of news frames without devolving into a bias study that fails to draw out implications and impact the reader.

It is the hope of this study of Venezuela in the U.S. press to draw attention to certain theoretical and analytical tools which journalism studies have been slow to incorporate but which could add to a substantial understanding of ideology, news discourse, and social structures. The critical approach of this study draws from linguistic theories of metaphor; Foucauldian concepts of discourse, knowledge, and power; and

postcolonial approaches that insist on a broad notion of history and nuanced understanding of context.

Ideology and Hegemony

In his book *Public Opinion* (1922/1965), Walter Lippmann suggested that a discrepancy exists between a real environment and a “pseudoenvironment” created by the news media. Since this early proposition that the news media do more than mirror reality, many scholars have come to argue that the news media also play a large role in constructing and maintaining social values and relationships. Some explanations argue that the media transmit these values from a small group of pro-active senders to the masses of passive receivers; others counter that media work more like a means of practicing and negotiating values. The actual processes most likely lie somewhere in between.

Generally speaking, the media assemble, construct, and package social meaning, allowing us to communicate and share cultural, political, and moral values across neighborhoods, cities, nations and the globe. For many studies of news construction, the central concern in all these aspects deals with the question of power. Which values do we accept as normal? Why those values and not others? To what end? *At whose expense?* These are the questions of ideology that underlie studies of news media as socio-cultural institutions which communicate ideologies in society with real political and economic consequences.

While ideology is a notoriously difficult concept to define, this study rests on the Gramscian-inspired understanding that Stuart Hall (1986) has described as “the mental framework – the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the systems of representation – which different classes and social groups deploy in order to

make sense of, define, figure out and render intelligible the way society works” (p. 29). The ongoing ideological struggle over “common sense” is the struggle over the political and economic power to define the world and our relationships to it and to each other.

Even though Marx himself did not use the term “ideology” as one clearly unified concept (Thompson, 1990), the current understandings of the concept build on his critique of economic domination. In their famous passage from *German Ideology*, Marx and Engels (1970) argued that:

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. (p. 64)

Much work has been done since to understand how this happens and, more complexly, why the dominating ideas at times fail to control and must evolve in response to resistance.

Theorists that are often called Neo-Marxists, such as Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser and Georg Lukács, incorporated concepts of culture and ideology to supplement this critique of domination (Kellner, 1995). In an effort to resist the economic reductionism that limits the potential for orthodox Marxism to explain the complexities of social life, Gramsci employed the term “hegemony” to more generally apply to the struggles of all classes (Mouffe, 1979). Hegemony better defines the complex cultural and ideological processes through which dominated groups come to support the ideas of those in power (Gramsci, 1971). Additionally, Althusser (1971) continued to build on this lineage by suggesting that “ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their conditions of existence” (p. 162). According to Althusser, this imaginary relationship exists materially in and is reproduced by social

institutions, which he called Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs), such as the educational system, family, mass media, etc. The net effect of the ideology that connects so many institutional realities to personal beliefs is a reproduction of the submission of dominated groups to the established relationships and values (Althusser, 1971).

The theoretical lineage of the concept of ideology is long and complex. For the purposes of this study, however, we can understand that there exists a complex relationship between media as social institutions, individual beliefs and actions, and ideologies that maintain (and sometimes challenge) the structures of power. Contrary to orthodox Marxism, which reduces ideology to economic class interests, many current critics argue that ideology should be extended to cover theories, ideas, texts, and representations that legitimate the interests of the ruling gender, race and class (Kellner, 1995).

Stuart Hall of the British Cultural Studies group played a significant role in applying the concept of hegemony to communication studies. According to Hall (1982), hegemony implied more of a concept of “cultural leadership” than “ideological compulsion,” meaning that an alliance of dominant classes:

extends and expands its mastery over society in such a way that it can transform and re-fashion its ways of life, its *mores* and conceptualization, its very form and level of culture and civilization in a direction which, while not directly paying immediate profits to the narrow interests of any particular class, favours the development and expansion of the dominant social and productive system of life as a whole. (p. 85)

Through cultural leadership, the dominant groups win the consent and active support of other groups and classes subordinate to the system. Through admirations of and aspirations to leadership, we support and contribute to the hegemonic worldview, which Hall (1980) has described as defining “within its terms the mental horizon, the universe, of possible meanings, of a whole sector of relations in society or culture,” and carrying

“with it the stamp of legitimacy – it appears coterminous with what is ‘natural,’ ‘inevitable,’ ‘taken for granted’ about the social order” (p. 137).

A hegemonic viewpoint, however, cannot be a completely integrated and solid structure. It must bend and adapt to resistance or the entire power structure would not survive. In news discourse, certain oppositional views are present and at times challenge the dominant interests (Carragee, 1993). (Often the contradictory values that surface to contest each other are both derived from the same ideological view.) Hall’s oft-quoted concept of dominant, negotiated and oppositional readings applies here. Even though there is no necessary correspondence between ideologically encoded messages and the receiver’s decoding of that message, a pattern of “preferred readings” emerges due to the reliance of hegemonic domination on common sense (Hall, 1980).

A major implication of preferred readings in terms of news discourse is that they are so consistently reproduced at the expense of alternative worldviews and ways of thinking about social relationships. As a hegemonic apparatus, mass media play an important role in maintaining the dominant ideology. The study of journalism in particular – given its explicit profession in objectivity, balance and fact – provides an excellent means of unpacking and making visible the very kernels of social, political and economic common sense, or taken-for-grantedness.

Discourse Analysis

A thorough discourse analysis is an attempt to make visible the invisible dimensions of ideology – linguistic, material, historical *and* cultural – embedded in a particular text or practice. The analysis of discourse, ideology and power draws from a poststructuralist understanding of language that points to the constructed nature of

knowledge. De-linking the connection between signifier and signified, this work helped to show how hegemony works through discourse. As Laclau has (1993) written:

there is a proliferation of “floating signifiers” in society, and political competition can be seen as attempts by rival political forces to partially fix those signifiers to particular signifying configurations. Discursive struggles about the ways of fixing the meaning of a signifier like “democracy,” for instance, are central to explain the political semantics of our contemporary political world. This partial fixing of the relation between signifier and signified is what...is called “hegemony.” (p. 435)

The “partial fixing” is not arbitrary, but rather is related to material and cultural power to engage with and influence discourse and is thus contingent. Although ideological struggle cannot be reduced to discourse, communication occupies a central role in expressing, implementing, reproducing, constructing and altering the principles that form the basis of worldviews.

The analysis of mass media texts allows a window into the forms of ideological discourse that take hold. Calling for more empirical research on ideology and discourse, Teun van Dijk (1998) has argued that “if we want to know what ideologies actually look like, how they work, and how they are created, changed and reproduced, we need to look closely at their *discursive manifestations*” (p. 6). For ideological discourse on modernization, the role of the state, and international policy, U.S. news coverage of Venezuela serves as the window of analysis for this study. By looking closely at the types of talk that are used in this coverage, I hope to identify specific struggles in the attempts to define, stage and delimit concepts of U.S. global hegemony. Among various “types of talk,” the analysis of metaphor is a particularly colorful and powerful way to grasp ideological content.

Metaphor in Discourse

Unlocking metaphors has been a powerful tool of semiotic analysis of media content (Berger, 1998). Rather than providing a list of lexical features, the analysis of metaphor allows us to unpack language using political, historical and contextual evidence – possibly capturing a link between *language* and *discourse*. This contributes to an understanding of how common sense and ideology function through a web of schemas and analogies. As Lakoff and Johnson (1980) in their seminal work on metaphors have argued, “metaphor is not just a matter of language, that is, of mere words...on the contrary, human *thought processes* are largely metaphorical” (p. 6). The metaphorical nature of thought creates the “natural” understandings that make common sense and hegemony so powerful. According to Lakoff and Johnson, we gain understanding of an abstract concept by comparing it to a more directly experienced concept. For example, Ghafele (2004) found in her analysis of the metaphors of globalization and trade concerning Africa two systematic analogies: 1) Africa’s complexities are understood in terms of pathology, wherein an ill and passive patient is in need of the medication of globalization, which often has bad side effects and is administered by an educated and authoritative doctor; and 2) modernization in Africa is understood via a fast-moving train – linear, irreversible, unstoppable – that should not be missed.

A metaphor works by highlighting certain aspects of the two concepts being compared and ignoring other characteristics that do not apply to the particular metaphorical understanding. Given that a metaphor highlights some characteristics and ignores others in order to create an analogy between two concepts, as the highlighted characteristics become common sense, the hidden ones become non-existent. The

ideological implications lie in this highlighting and hiding work of metaphors. For example, the authors pointed out that the belief that labor is a resource, a metaphor used to understand the abstract concept of labor in terms of a concrete natural resource or commodity, obscures the distinction between *meaningful* labor and *dehumanizing* labor. As a commodity, undifferentiated labor is expected to compete in a market that consistently drives down the cost of labor. Cheap labor, they argued, becomes understood as desirable and necessary via this metaphor, and the ideological implications can be seen in the understanding of virtual slavery around the world as “natural.” For Lakoff and Johnson, the problematic issue of metaphors is less the truth or falsity of the representation than the “perceptions and inferences that follow from it and the actions that are sanctioned by it” (p. 158).

Drawing on the constructivist paradigm that arose from poststructuralist critique and on findings in cognitive science, Santa Ana (2002) has examined metaphor as a “principle unit of hegemonic expression” in discursive practice (p. 9). Analyzing public discourse on three California propositions in the 1990s – to restrict immigrant access to public services and bilingual education and to end affirmative action in higher education – Santa Ana found metaphors used in *The Los Angeles Times* as powerful cognitive maps of the debates. He showed how different groups shaped, limited and defined the terms of debate by using vivid metaphors of the body, land, water, war and machinery. “Everyday metaphor,” he argued “weaves the patterns of social relations into natural language expression” (p. 20). Arguing against the positivist understanding of metaphor as rhetorical frills that reflect and picture everyday life, Santa Ana (2002) pointed to reaction-time experiments that show faster comprehension when metaphors are used. If metaphors were simply expressions painted over the literal world, translation from

figurative to literal meaning would take longer, not shorter processing time to comprehend. The inference drawn from such cognitive research is that metaphor is a process of construction of meaning through complex maps, schemas and informational networks in the brain; metaphor more than reflects reality, it constructs how we process reality.

This understanding of maps and schemas is similar to the understanding of ideology used by Stuart Hall and also Teun van Dijk. The metaphors used in discourse are a means of fixing certain floating signifiers, creating systems of representation that make sense of the world. Metaphors are not a static, fixed aspect of discourse, but rather reflect systematic concepts that structure our actions and thoughts. The connection between structural concept and action is a dialectical one, always dynamic, and the potential for change or a rupture in the structure occurs each time the metaphorical concept is put into practice. This potential leads toward emergent metaphors and concepts that challenge and reorient analogies and beliefs.

Schön (1979), for example, has argued that the metaphorical understanding of low-income neighborhoods as diseased and decaying urban blight has a strong influence on the policymaking approaches to such neighborhoods that attempt to *cure* the disease and *eradicate* slums. He argued that an alternative understanding of such neighborhoods as remarkably adaptable, resourceful and creative “folk communities” may encourage alternative policy approaches. This example illuminates the connection between thought and action and the role of metaphor in actual power structures.

After Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’s recent speech to the U.N., including his rhetorical flourishes comparing President Bush to the devil, the Venezuelan president is by now familiar among many Americans, as is the Bush administration’s strained

relationship with Chávez. As public discourse grows on this international topic, it is important to monitor how our arguments and actions become defined and staged, as they are certain to contribute to the struggle to define a global life worth living. In monitoring this flow of discourse, metaphors provide schematic clues: “Conventional metaphors set up relations that are deeply fixed in everyday thinking and are reconstructed from moment to moment as people talk” (Santa Ana, 2002, p. 40). This aspect of ideological thinking can help explain both why structures seem so determining and inert and also how change is possible at all. Santa Ana has proposed conceiving language as a toolmaker, rather than a tool, that can replace and revise deficient understandings and mappings with alternative ones.

Venezuela’s Political Background

This study attempts to address the challenge presented by the work of postcolonial theorists, such as Edward Said, to broaden our horizons both globally and historically when analyzing discourse. Many journalism studies have analyzed the ideological implications of the Cold war for the U.S. news media, but few go as far back as the era of high colonialism and imperialism. This study will analyze *The New York Times’* editorials concerning Venezuela over the last century. Although the current international situation between the Bush and Chávez administrations is heated and at times rhetorically sensational, a historical approach to this international relationship is necessary to better comprehend the ideological work of the press. This study will look at the three time periods within the last century in which the U.S. was relatively engaged with Venezuelan politics.

Colonial Era

What this study terms the “Colonial Era” includes the years 1897 through 1908, a period during which the U.S. acquired its first overseas colonies and successfully challenged Europe as the dominant force in the Latin American region.

Venezuela, after three hundred years of colonial history under Spanish rule, fought a regional war under the military general Simón Bolívar, declared independence in 1811 and established a republic. Rebuffed in their attempts to sway the U.S. into intervening to help Venezuelans maintain independence, Bolívar and his companions became disillusioned with their hope for a pan-American republican solidarity in the face of Old World imperialism and monarchy (Ewell, 1996). Instead of finding themselves welcomed into a brotherhood of principled democracy and national sovereignty, Venezuelans faced a superior and racist attitude from many U.S. diplomats and officials, who began to characterize their leaders early on as tyrants, imbeciles and dictators (ibid., p. 26).

At the same time, commerce and trade were firmly established, and an independent Venezuela was considered by the U.S. as an important access point to South America. Adelman (2002) has argued that the resulting system for Venezuela was a mix of colonial, *caudillo*, and market-oriented policy:

Careful management of complex patronage networks ballasted, without fully legitimating, authoritarian political systems and capitalist property relations. Hybrid societies, graphically depicted by José Carlos Mariátegui, blended the coercion of colonial extractive traditions with unfettered markets, and wrapped a republican constitutional fabric around personal clientelist systems. (p. 43)

According to John Lombardi (2003), the tradition of colonial extraction of coca and coffee extended into this period, constraining the possibilities of Venezuelan politics. (With the subsequent discovery of oil, these constraints only became more entrenched.)

The government that inherits this “Hispanic extractive engine,” according to Lombardi, is dependent on world prices for these commodities. When the prices fall, the government often borrows money to maintain social stability and evidence of progress. This international debt, in turn, makes the government more dependent on the extraction of their primary export and more submissive to international pressure (Lombardi, 2003; see also Coronil, 1997). Although Lombardi has noted that Venezuela did not garner much attention from the international community before oil, Ewell’s (1996) documentation of correspondence between the U.S. and Venezuelan governments between 1897 and 1908 points to a few conflicts that engaged both governments. These incidents invoked a high level of editorializing from *The New York Times*.

As the dictator Cipriano Castro held power in Venezuela from 1899 to 1908, the U.S. experienced a rise of sporadic anti-Americanism from Venezuela. Castro’s defiance of the wishes of U.S. interests earned him the description by Theodore Roosevelt as “an unspeakably villainous little monkey” (quoted in Ewell, 1996, p. 99). In particular, Castro had challenged the property claims of the New York & Bermuda Asphalt Company, accused various U.S. investors of treasonous collusion in Venezuelan politics, and failed to pay on Venezuela’s debt to European nations, resulting in a blockade of the Venezuelan coasts, the threat of war and the depression of U.S. trade in the area (Ewell, 1996).

Cold War Era

This period includes the transitional years from dictatorship to democracy in Venezuela. In 1958, the nation’s right-wing military forces were permanently replaced by constitutional democracy, Rómulo Betancourt, previously exiled and living in the U.S., was elected president. In response to the previous era of military rule and a failed

democratic experiment from 1945 to 1948, the emerging parties after the 1958 election devised the Pact of Punto Fijo in order to diffuse the Communist left and ensure the order and stability that would obviate military intervention by the Venezuelan right (Adelman, 2002). Kenneth Roberts has argued that the main left-democratic party of Betancourt, the Acción Democrática (AD), moderated its stance and negotiated social, political and economic pacts to assuage Venezuela's elite distrust of social reforms and protect the property rights of business. Given the political collusion and class compromise that resulted from high oil rents, elections became non-ideological and non-programmatic and class cleavage eroded (Roberts, 2003).

According to political scientist Daniel Hellinger (2003), the success of the Punto Fijo project derived from a mutually beneficial relationship with the post-World War II U.S. international hegemony. Betancourt garnered the support and approval of U.S. leaders, such as Nelson Rockefeller, and Venezuela became the democratic model held up against Cuban-style revolution. "That is," Hellinger has written, "the minimalist democracy established by the Pact of Punto Fijo was a polyarchy, a form of weak democracy preferred by the U.S. elites to more radical, participatory, egalitarian regimes" (2003, p. 27). For example, Hellinger pointed out, Betancourt's version of Venezuelan sovereignty never entertained the possibility of state ownership of foreign companies, most significantly in the oil industry.

Although champions of Venezuelan democracy celebrated what they saw as a stable, experienced, middle-class, disciplined democratic practice, by the 1990s the political system attained a widespread reputation as a corrupt, mismanaged and inefficient "partyarchy" (Ellner, 2003). This study looks at the editorials in *The New York Times* from 1958 to 1968 in order to capture the newspaper's understanding of the

emergence of democracy in Venezuela. After 1968, the *Times* apparently did not publish another editorial on Venezuela until 1975.

Current Era

From 1958 until 1998, power oscillated between two government parties now widely acknowledged as corrupt and negligent of Venezuela's poor (Coppedge, 1994; Hillman, 1994). After forty years of democracy and oil wealth, the majority of the population remained in poverty with limited access to basic needs, such as water, sanitation, and medical care (Marquez, 2003), and workers found themselves facing decreased health and real wages and an increased informal sector (Lalander, 1998). In the early 1990s, revolts against capitulation to neoliberal economic policy became widespread, including riots in 1989 and a failed coup attempt in 1992, led by an army lieutenant-colonel named Hugo Chávez. In 1998, the president was formally indicted on corruption charges, and Chávez was elected as president by a large majority. Since then, the outspoken leftist populist was re-elected in 2000, re-instated after a coup attempt in 2002, and given a sixty percent vote of confidence in a highly controversial referendum held in 2004 (Gott, 2005). On December 3, 2006, Chávez was re-elected again as president by the same sixty-percent majority that has consistently supported him.

The general political situation in Venezuela since the late 1980s has been one of extreme polarization and heightening tension as a large poor majority now maintains control of the government in opposition to a smaller but well-organized union of the business and middle classes (Ellner, 2003). As Ellner (2003) has stated, this "social polarization in Venezuela is more pronounced than ever, reflecting recent trends throughout the third world" (p. 24). Recently, other Latin American populations have

grown discontent with U.S.-oriented free trade policies and are electing more leftist and socialist leaders, as in Brazil, Bolivia, Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, and Uruguay.

Nationalism and the News

The relationship between the nation-state and mass media has been of central theoretical concern in communications studies. Benedict Anderson's (1991) well-known concept of the nation as an "imagined community" posited the mass media – particularly the newspaper, the novel, and print-capitalism in general – as a primary actor in this imagining. Jürgen Habermas (1989) famously argued that the institutional development of mass media and the state, at least in the Western world, has been inextricable and mutually constitutive. Michael Schudson (1994) has also reiterated the role of imagination in non-interpersonal communication: "All societies are fictive. Personal identification with any grouping of people beyond those one encounters face to face in daily life (and perhaps, even there, too) depends on an imaginative leap" (p. 24).

The question of how this imagining works and with what results is often the focus of studies of national representations in the news. The construction of nationality in media representations is the construction of bounded territoriality, of "Us" and "Them." As Frosh and Wolfsfeld (2006) have argued: "Such cumulative media representations provide individuals with a version of what their societies look like as a whole, imparting a seemingly natural sense of how society 'is' and how one is located within it" (p. 106). These representations of "place" in the social construct of nationality influence individual and social knowledges of national identity and international, or intercultural, relationships (Drzewiecka, 2003). In turn, these knowledges "allow for the fabrication, rearrangement, elaboration, and omission of details about the past, often pushing aside accuracy and authenticity so as to accommodate broader issues of identity formation,

power and authority, and political affiliation” (Zelizer, quoted in Le, 2006, p. 709). Zelizer’s work has shown that the way journalists represent the past has relevance to how we imagine the present and future. Le (2006) has argued that the representations of national identities are often a “prisoner of the past,” meaning past imaginations or ideologies, and in being so can hinder new understandings of intercultural relations.

Le has also argued for the relevance of editorials in studying national representations in the news:

Editorials are short pieces of argumentative writing that directly reflect a newspaper’s position on an issue it deems important. In this respect, editorials differ from articles that are supposed to present current news in an objective manner. Thus, editorials can be considered as significant manifestations of the concept of “news framing”....The discourse analysis of editorials on a specific issue...provides an interpretive framework for the newspaper’s global coverage on that issue. (p. 711)

This study positions editorials in much the same way, arguing that the editorials represent the manifested worldviews and ideologies of the more powerful figures in the most prestigious source of international news. These worldviews arguably provide the ideological framework for the newspaper’s international reporting in general.

LITERATURE REVIEW

International News in the U.S.

Previous studies of U.S. coverage of Latin America have pointed to the overabundance of negativity, violence and destruction (Rosenblum, 1979); the lack of depth and complexity (Carragee, 2003); the overemphasis of U.S. political and economic interests (Herman & Chomsky, 1988); and the reliance on government officials as sources (Sigal, 1973). Many critics contend that these practices define international issues in the interest of U.S. elites, ignoring alternative explanations. Paletz and Entman (1981) asserted that “on foreign policy, the mass media tend to...limit rather than expand public knowledge of alternative possibilities,” in effect becoming “conduits of elites’ visions of America’s overseas interests” (p. 215).

Larson, McAnany, and Storey (1986) have described a decade’s worth of network news coverage of the region as *ad hoc* caricatures of crisis situations as reported through a Cold War lens by Washington sources and lacking any sense of ongoing development and explanation. The authors noted: “The sense of caricature presented by...television news is disturbing, especially if we make two assumptions: first, that Latin America is an area of significant policy interest to the U.S. and second, that an informed public is an important element in the policymaking process” (p. 182). When coverage focuses on crisis situations and privileges official sources, the resultant frames tend to resemble the official U.S. policy line and to neglect alternative explanations that warrant public consideration.

Herman (1985) found this effect when he analyzed *The New York Times’* coverage of the 1984 presidential elections in El Salvador and Nicaragua. These two

elections occurred under very similar circumstances, but his analysis of the coverage found that the ideological frames present were markedly different from each other, resembling the positions of the White House. The same issues, such as human rights and electoral procedures, were highlighted in one case and downplayed in the other, in line with official U.S. policy toward that nation. Also, Herman noted that *The New York Times* was eerily silent on issues of concern against U.S. policy. Quantifying the frequency of ideological elements in the news stories, Herman concluded that, on foreign policy issues, a “propaganda framework” allows the government to produce news that a normally cooperative mass media will disseminate.

This harsh criticism may be well deserved in many instances, but what about when the press *does* question Washington policy? Hallin (1986) has pointed out that *The New York Times*’ coverage of Central American civil wars in the 1980s was often critical of U.S. policy goals as well as Cold War assumptions that in earlier years were taken for granted. The emergence of criticisms of U.S. policy in this era seemed to show *The New York Times*’ dedication to objectivity and ability to criticize the elite position. Hallin maintained, however, that the press’ “coming of age” in the Watergate and Vietnam era was synchronous with a breakdown of consensus among elites in general. Division among elites “triggered a different mode of reporting” that targeted specific elites within a “sphere of legitimate controversy” (p. 10).

He explained how this seemingly antagonistic coverage of elites maintained valuable ideologies in the tumultuous times surrounding the Vietnam War. In this era, the news media allowed dissenting elites to frame the boundary of legitimate debate around tactics and mistakes in war plans, but they did not entertain the oppositional frame that much of U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia at that time was illegal and

inhumane. Such coverage may appear antagonistic toward White House policy, but it fails to criticize the control the U.S. exercises over international politics. That the U.S. should control international politics is not a natural proposition, but is rather an assumption of an ethnocentric geopolitical frame derived from the viewpoint of elite U.S. sources. Bennett (1990) has termed this phenomenon “indexing,” arguing that “mass media professionals, from the boardroom to the beat, tend to ‘index’ the range of voices and viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic” (p. 106). The range varies according to issue, with division among elites producing a broader range of views in the news and consensus a more narrow range – which is more often the case concerning foreign policy.

Carragee (2003) has maintained a similar argument in his qualitative study of *The New York Times*’ coverage of the end of the Cold War. He argued that the challenges to Central American policy in the 1980s that Hallin identified in news coverage represent a “high-water mark of the American news media’s challenge to the political orthodoxy associated with the Cold War” (p. 304). In contrast, Carragee argued, as the Berlin Wall gave way to the development promises of the 1990s, *The New York Times* was still emphasizing looming crises, elite consensus, the need for skilled management of world affairs by the U.S., and disparagement of opposition movements to U.S. policy. Bennett (1990) had found that when there was debate among elites concerning Nicaragua in the 1980s, *The New York Times* discussed multiple views and even turned to nonofficial sources for information. By 1986, however, Reagan had garnered support from Congress and opposition views all but disappeared in *The New York Times*.

Collectively, studies on coverage of Latin America in the U.S. do not bode well for the democratic function of the press in foreign policy toward the region. Paletz and Entman (1981) have attempted to explain this connection, claiming that the coverage described above can contribute to a “renascent hawkishness” in defense spending and corporate lobbying efforts. They argued that the stereotype of violent, strife-ridden and undesirable life in less industrialized countries and the lack of viable foreign alternatives to the U.S. system are elements of “a stream of events and messages” (p. 229). This stream affects public opinion of these nations and our economic and military policies toward them “where public and official unfamiliarity with the countries leads them to rely most heavily on media accounts” (p. 221).

Given that these criticisms of U.S. international coverage span the last three decades, and that the current framing of Venezuelan politics, as noted above, does not show much evidence of change in response to such criticism, a deeper ideological analysis is called for. I attempt such an analysis here, investigating the Venezuelan context and drawing on critical and cultural theories of discourse in order to further analyze the roles that the U.S. mainstream media play in these international relations. Postcolonial analysis, one of the more powerful recent methods in critical theory, changes our camera angle, so to speak, positioning us from the points of view of the so-called “Third World” so that we may more clearly assess the Western ideologies of modernization so taken for granted in the U.S.

Postcolonial Social Theory

Postcolonialism, rooted in the fields of literature and anthropology, critically assesses the limits of the project of European modernity (see, for example Bhabha, 1994; Chakrabarty, 2000; Said, 1978; and Spivak, 1987). Faced with the realities of

colonialism and its continuing effects, the universalism of reason, democracy, autonomy, equality and civil society has been shown to be social, rather than “natural,” law. These values, which Europe and the U.S. define and then assume to be universally desirable, appear in the light of colonial history as vested interests. From rationalizing slavery and the appropriation of natural resources as a “civilizing mission,” to insisting on neoliberal economic policies as the path to equality, freedom and modernization, the values of modernity often function in the so-called “Third World” as boundaries and limitations that further inequality and prevent justice.

The key to postcolonial analysis is a focus on the production of historical and geographical knowledges. How did these Eurocentric values come to be institutionalized as knowledge? How are they reproduced and challenged over time? What role do they play in the contemporary global situation of inequality between the so-called First and Third Worlds? Edward Said initiated this critical work with his seminal book *Orientalism*, published in 1978, which argued that the vivid descriptions of the exotic Orient found in colonial-era anthropology and literature helped shape the Western view of the world on a racialized, hierarchical basis. This basis, argued Said and later postcolonials, was used to interpret and justify colonialism and imperialism as necessary to the “civilizing mission” of instilling the world’s barbarians with the values of reason, order, and commerce, among others (Iskandar, 2005; Patke, 2006). This academic and literary knowledge production of colonialism as a civilizing mission is inextricably implicated in the history of empire.

The history of colonialism and empire is a history that is not assumed by postcolonial theorists to exist solely in the past, but rather as operating, albeit in some

different manifestations, in today's context of globalization and modernity. The term "postcolonial," Patke (2006) has claimed:

implies awareness of the ways in which modes of thought and belief learned through colonial history continue to affect cultures after the formal collapse of empires. It turns to cultural productions and practices for an imprint of, and a reaction to, the residual force of colonialism on societies whose contemporary history is shaped by asymmetrical patterns of modernization, industrialization and globalization. (p. 370)

The political project of postcolonialism is to uncover and practice new ways of knowing that were supposed to have been eradicated by colonialism and the civilizing project of modernity: "The driving force of postcolonial work" according to Shome and Hedge (2002) "is to interrogate the universalizing discourse of Western modernity" (p. 262).

This role of discourse is what connects communication studies to postcolonial theory, although "journalism, mass communication, and rhetorical studies have been slow to recognize the analytical possibilities" this work offers (Parameswaran, 2002, p. 288). In a special issue of *Communication Theory*, communication scholars such as Raka Shome, Radha Hedge and Lawrence Grossberg called for further integration of this approach into the discipline. According to Parameswaran in the same issue, the combination of semiotic, feminist and Marxist textual analysis with postcolonial vocabularies can be applied to journalism "to empower media scholars to disrupt the hegemony of dominant discourses that shape conversations over key cultural and economic developments in the global public sphere" (2002, p. 312). Her critique of *National Geographic's* portrayal of globalization provides an excellent example of how the postcolonial approach can add conceptual depth of history and globalization to critiques of race and gender.

Before delving into a review of this work in the field of journalism, some fundamental terms relevant to postcolonial theory should be elaborated and discussed –

although it should be kept in mind that, by the nature of this theoretical body of work, these terms overlap and evade strict definition, as they are useful only insofar as they apply to any given context. Unless otherwise noted, the following discussion of terms draws from Robert Young's (2001) erudite analysis of the world's anti-colonial movements and the accompanying theories in *Postcolonialism: An historical introduction*.

Third World

The hierarchical nature of the term "Third World" has been criticized for its subordinate relation to the First and Second Worlds, as well as for its loaded implications of debt, famine, poverty, conflict and strife. Likewise, the term "the (global) South" is disputed for its homogenization of so many classes, countries and peoples, and "the non-West" for its negative definition and its implication of a clean dichotomy. Instead, Young has proposed using such terms as "the three continents" or "tricontinentalism" in order to highlight the heterogeneity, vastness and solidarity that apply to the histories of Africa, Asia and Latin America. These terms – endorsed by Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America at Havana in 1966 – will be used as appropriate in this thesis to reference what is more commonly known as the "Third World."

Colonialism

Whereas imperialism is more of an ideological concept of a global political system, colonialism is more of a localized practice. Colonialism refers to the various ways of implementing such an imperial system, such as Spanish conquest, British direct or indirect rule, or French assimilation, in all its different contexts: the Amazon, North America, India, Algeria, the Middle East, the Congo, Australia, etc. An important

distinction resides between settlement and exploitive colonization. Often settlers are conceived as both colonizers and colonized, but the indigenous peoples and imported slaves do not generally occupy this ambiguous identity. On the one hand, settler colonialism has often played a predominant role in population control – exporting political undesirables, establishing new colonies for trade, releasing economic tension – for “mother” countries. Exploitation colonialism, on the other hand, played a more direct role in the desire for riches, commercial profit, and international power plays.

Initially, according to Young, colonization was economically driven. Capitalism and its modes of production and trade were used to transform indigenous economies, often enforced by militarized occupation. With the exception of Latin America and other plantation economies, Europeans did not initially attempt to transpose cultural values onto the indigenous or justify their actions with ideological rationales. “Colonization was not primarily concerned with transposing cultural values. They came as a by-product of its real objectives of trade, economic exploitation and settlement” (Young, 2001, p. 24). The central role that colonialism plays in postcolonial analysis is due to the connection of the global historical with the global present – a connection most recognizable as the universalization of the western linear model of technological progress, development and power.

Imperialism

Whereas colonialism operated with economic, practical and utilitarian motives, imperialism constituted the ideological work that became necessary to support such systems. Imperialism gave “cultural meaning to the historical practice of colonialism,” and due to its nature as an ideological force, imperialism at times can even include a sense of paranoia that may work against economic or pragmatic interests (Young, 2001,

p. 28). “Imperialism is characterized by the exercise of power either through direct conquest or through political and economic influence that effectively amounts to a similar form of domination; both involve the practice of power through facilitating institutions and ideologies” (ibid, p. 27). These “facilitating institutions and ideologies” are the hegemonic crux of the global political system that results from the era of high imperialism and colonialism at the end of the nineteenth century – they constitute both the source of power and targets for resistance.

French imperialism was based on the concept of *mission civilisatrice*, or civilizing mission, which was derived from Enlightenment philosophies of equality, fraternity, and liberty of humankind. In comparison to other empires, French colonies offered the “best” educational and cultural facilities to many of their colonized subjects but demanded renunciation of other cultures and religions. They believed that other races could be “improved.” According to Young, this form of imperialism constitutes a “paradox of ethnocentric egalitarianism,” or, in other words, a progressive notion of the fundamental equality of humanness that was the least essentializing or racist of the imperial ideologies but most culturally oppressive in its profound disdain for other cultures, languages and religions.

British imperialism, by contrast, was an ideology of association, non-interference, and outright rejection of the French approach to assimilation. Although this form of imperialism today appears more liberal and less culturally oppressive (almost multiculturalist), it was paradoxically based on the most racialized or essentialist hierarchy of culture, and opposed the “mixing” of races and cultures. After the war with North American colonies in 1776 (producing a federated system of free trade and self-government among Anglo-Saxon settler colonies) and the 1857 “mutiny” in India (ending

progressive reform policies and instituting more oppressive centralized control of dependent colonies), the British system became explicitly two-fold according to race. This distinction heightened anti-colonial movements within the dependent, or exploited, colonies that demanded treatment equal to the liberal autonomy of the white settler colonies. Rather than openly admit the contradictions of a racialized hierarchy of colonies, a “racialized time scale” became the ideological rationale for trusteeship of exploited colonies. “Imperial duty was now double: first to exploit for the benefit of others (‘the civilized world’) the availability of raw materials that would otherwise be left unused, and then to extend the culture of civilization to the society being exploited” (Young, 2001, p. 40). This system was legitimated for a time through the use of propaganda and appeals to patriotic pride in the empire.

At the end of the nineteenth century, however, a new imperialism emerged, with aspects of both the French and British ideologies, which became conceived of as American. Under sustained liberal (economic) and Marxist critiques of colonialism, the imperial system shifted from direct conquest to economic domination. As colonies began to win their independence, new forms of economic domination by the ambivalent colonized/colonizing U.S. took hold hegemonically.

Neocolonialism

Lest we imagine that the concepts of neocolonialism and economic domination stretch the definition of colonialism too far, we should not forget that the United States is, in fact, a colonial power in the Old-World sense: Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and various Pacific islands remain colonized territories under U.S. control; indigenous peoples in the U.S, including in Alaska and Hawaii, continue to contest annexation; and an emerging concept in the mainstream immigration debate in the U.S.

is captured with the Latino/a slogan “We didn’t cross the border; the border crossed us.” Given this lingering evidence, there are nevertheless distinct qualities of the new imperialism, hence the term *neocolonialism*.

Young has described neocolonialism as “a continuing economic hegemony that means that the postcolonial state remains in a situation of dependence on its former masters, and that the former masters continue to act in a colonialist manner towards formerly colonized states” (p. 45). In a shift from physical to ideological control, the elite in newly independent states take on a hegemonic role in the interest of international capital. This role is often supplemented by the policing powers of external military invasion, of internal use of army and police, and of world financial organizations. A “colonialist manner” may seem an abstract idea, but in the concrete, as Young and others have described, it appears quite familiar as: a) economic and political policy, as well as technology, directed from outside; b) military aid that increases dependency; c) cheap labor that joins raw materials as an economic resource, requiring political stability, infrastructure and a trained work force; d) imperial-funded non-governmental organizations; e) “unveiling” women and secularizing religion; f) exporting unhealthy or harmful products and waste to “weaker” nations; and g) an imbalance of resource consumption.

A characteristic of this list that stands out is the interconnectedness of imposed policy and humanitarianism. The latter, although not innately malignant, often serves hegemonically in support of the former; its ambivalent lineage dates back to the civilizing mission of French imperialism. This last point helps to illuminate, for the analysis below, the shifting and contradictory nature of neocolonialism, modernization and humanitarianism. Careful discourse analysis can identify hegemonic co-optation of

humanitarian sympathies as well as moments of resistance and solidarity by holding rhetoric up in the light of historically colonial discourse.

Finally, one major problem with the neocolonialism critique – and its theoretical cousin, dependency theory – is that it does not conceptualize resistance and change: “As a concept, neocolonialism is as disempowering as the conditions it portrays. Removal of the possibilities of agency is equally a problem of more recent theories of power operating through economic exploitation” (Young, 2001, p. 49). A complex critique of globalization and modernity discourses would analyze resistant forces and change over time as well as the political realities of dominance and continuity through time in order to better understand the world, how it came to us, and how we represent it.

Journalism and Colonial Discourse

As noted above, Edward Said is responsible for bridging the political commitments and ideological critiques of the anti-colonial movements with structuralist and poststructuralist theories of knowledge as epistemic violence, “moving the analysis of colonialism, imperialism and the struggles against it to the question of discourse” (Young, 2001, p. 384). Said argued that Orientalist discourse produces a dichotomy that represents the East as voiceless, sensual, feminine, despotic, irrational, exotic, barbarian and uncivilized; the West as masculine, democratic, rational, moral, dynamic and progressive (Said, 1978). These consistent representations throughout colonialist discourse remain the basis of our knowledge about the world outside Euroamerica, knowledge that is relied on in constructing international relations and policy. Since *Orientalism*, many academic fields have looked to colonial discourse to analyze how knowledge is (re)produced and how knowledge-producing institutions are implicated in colonialism and its continuing effects. Studies of journalism have recently taken up this

form of analysis, in extension of research questioning journalism's role in power, ideology and foreign policy.

Ilia Rodríguez (1998) has looked at news reporting during the Spanish-American war of 1898 in order to analyze representations of Puerto Ricans as the U.S. assumed control over the colony. Popularly known as an era of "yellow journalism," this period of reporting has been criticized for its "rally-round-the-flag," or jingoistic sensationalism of the war. Rodríguez, however, applied the concept of colonial discourse analysis in order to interpret how issues of race, colonization, imperialism, and economic progress were incorporated into policy through a public discourse that emerged to justify conquering and continual colonial administration of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines by the U.S. Journalism and mass media, she argued, are "key practices and institutions whereby the production of a discourse about the colonized is controlled, selected and organized" (p. 284).

Using David Spurr's (1993) analytical model of the main features of colonial discourse (see below), Rodríguez determined four complementary rhetorical modes in the reporting: 1) affirmation of the U.S. as morally, technologically and economically superior; 2) surveillance of the island's infrastructure, strategic location and natural resources without regard to local perspectives; 3) classification of categories of natives to correspond with different administrative tactics; 4) debasement of indigenous peoples as mobs, savage, lazy, backward, etc. Rodríguez concluded that "U.S. press coverage of the Spanish-American war was more than propaganda or sensationalist and jingoistic reporting. News reporting was also a form of discourse that, in a colonizing gesture, inscribed an identity for the colonized, and provided justification for the colonial administration of Puerto Rico by the United States" (1998, p. 299). This notion of

identity and representation of the Other, combined with extensive historical context of the economic, political and ideological interests involved, is the mark of this emerging analysis of the ideological role of journalism.

Olga Bailey (2005) has focused on the significance of identity-making in journalism, incorporating Derrida's concept of "violence of the letter" that one culture imposes on another in the naming, classifying, differentiating and interpellating work that writing performs. "The very process," she argued, "by which one culture subordinates another begins in the act of naming and leaving unnamed, of marking on an unknown territory the lines of division and uniformity, of boundary and continuity" (2005, p.1). Journalism often acts as part of this process as a "popularizer of the ideology of modernism," industrialization, and imperial expansion. A politics of naming in journalism refers to the construction of a preferred view of reality that is embedded with ideological content that superficially appears natural. Bailey's analysis of British media after the September 11 events has highlighted the subsequent reaction to asylum seekers and immigrants as defining and naming them as the "Other" and dichotomizing "us versus them." This is a historically colonial form of discourse that defines the Other as non-western, on the fringe of geopolitics, and a savage whose lack of civilized virtue invites threat, hostility and antagonism. "The residual aspects of a colonial discourse seem to have survived beyond the classic colonial era and continue to colour perceptions of the non-western world through the politics of naming thus establishing the ideological difference from the West" (p. 3).

Landers (2006) has looked at the colonial discourse itself, analyzing the discourse in three quality monthly magazines at the turn of the century. As the U.S. debated assuming an "island empire" from the Spanish in the 1890s, the expansionist

and anti-imperialist arguments were captured and, to different degrees, legitimated in the journalism of *Century*, *Cosmopolitan*, and *McClure's*. Whereas expansion across the American continent previous to the 1898 war was compatible with ideals of republicanism that linked individual liberty with agrarian society and the availability of land, the accession of the “island empire” suddenly positioned the U.S. as an imperialist nation. The new rationale that developed in the debate on expansion was “one based on an amalgam of national sense of mission, Anglo-Saxon racial superiority, and Social Darwinism among nations” (p. 96). Although the era’s reporting documented resistant arguments from anti-imperialists, they were commonly portrayed as idealists: “Newspapers responded with articles and editorials that tended to promote nationalism and economic self-interest at the expense of idealism” (p. 96).

One theme that runs through these studies of colonial discourse in journalism is an ever-increasing and complex understanding of the historical and material circumstances surrounding a particular issue. These analyses are not merely rhetorical or linguistic, but also contextual. For example, part of Landers’ discussion includes the transformation from an agrarian to industrial economy and the resulting labor radicalism and social unrest that was taking place in the U.S. at the time. Gilded Age extravagance and abject poverty were also key factors in the path that imperialist discourse assumed. Expansionism could deflect unrest at home. These historical analyses are important to understanding how public discourse is constructed and why certain frames and representations “win out” over others.

A. Lazar and M. M. Lazar (2004) have described this necessary contextualization as “politico-historical conditions that have made the articulation and elaboration of this particular set of statements possible” (p. 225). In their analysis of discourse at the end of

the Cold War, they pointed to contextual factors such as the determination of the U.S. to remain a superpower after the threat of the Soviet Union was dissolved and the commercial competition from Europe and Japan appeared on the wane. This determination produced the need to articulate new threats and the relevance of U.S. world leadership that continued to position the U.S. in control. “One such approach was the geo-strategic model, which emphasized both American military leadership in countering global aggression and the maintenance of a liberal-democratic internationalism” (p. 225). In addition to articulation, this modified worldview needed to be legitimated and performed periodically (thus the role of the news media).

Four elements of the statements on moral order in the post-Cold War world include defining the moral order, belonging to it, leading it, and defending it. Lazar and Lazar, drawing from Foucault’s work on discourse, analyzed the element of definition: “The public moral order is built up normatively vis-à-vis the articulation of the aberrant ‘other’ or ‘threat’ which, at the same time, justifies the identification, division and excision of that threat” (p. 227). In the post-Cold War, the authors asked how Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden had been articulated and constructed as enemy threats to moral order. The authors labeled this process of identity-making “outcasting,” which includes rhetorical modes of enemy construction, criminalization, orientalizing and (e)vilification. This last mode, the authors argued, is an emergent one in the post-Cold War world, pointing to a more clear and systematic enunciation of the spiritual or religious element in outcasting. This development in the rhetoric of justification possibly fills a vacuum left by the ideological battle between capitalism (good) and communism (evil). Combining this rhetorical analysis of knowledge-making with a material analysis of vested interests constitutes the lens of colonial discourse analysis. In terms of

Venezuela, Lazar and Lazar's study can illuminate the process of friend- and enemy-construction that establishes an identity of Venezuelans in U.S. public discourse and, in part, determines our interaction with them.

Isabel Molina-Guzmán (2003) has questioned the ideological location of Latinos/as in U.S. popular imagination by analyzing journalism's role in maintaining "the symbolic borders of the imagined nation during a time of increased cultural flux" (p. 2). Her analysis of television news coverage of the Elián González controversy unpacked the familiar narratives of a clearly dichotomized race or ethnicity that were employed regardless of the ambiguous and hybridized identity of Cuban-Americans. "How do journalists," she asked, "as national storytellers, write about a group whose growing numbers and physical hybridity threaten to re-define dominant binary hierarchies" (p. 5)? She identified various colonialist rhetorical modes in the coverage that worked together to deny legitimacy to Cuban-Americans as a hybrid culture and subordinate Latino/as in general to a dominant culture of civilized whiteness. A "trope of tropicalism," whose lineage dates back to anthropological writings of the colonialist era, is often applied to Latin American and U.S. Latino/a cultures through mentions of brown or olive skin, religiosity, emotionality, and metaphors of heat. In the debate over Elián González' place in the world, Cuban-Americans were consistently represented as volatile, emotional, hotheaded, lawless, zealous with prayer and tears, and generally outside the borders of social and institutional acceptability.

By contrast, "experts, government sources and journalists through their performance of whiteness become the background against which the Latino Other is contrasted and ultimately judged" (p. 15). Sentiments of political activists and passionate supporters were counter-acted by authoritative legal and business discourse.

Institutional authority was represented as standing firm, giving stern warnings, and telling people to calm down; an infantilized community is seen and not heard, in contrast to the paternalistic and patriarchal authority of U.S. institutions. After all the journalistic commentary, Molina-Guzmán argues, the community is “left at odds with itself and with the U.S. population at large. The dominant ideology of the institutional hegemony is recuperated through the symbolic colonization of the Cuban American community” (p. 18). She concluded that these journalistic practices of symbolic colonization function as a consensus narrative and affirm the national boundaries that are defined by the values, ideology and performance of whiteness.

Many of these more recent studies on colonial discourse in journalism refer to one work in particular that provides an excellent model for analysis. David Spurr’s (1993) *The Rhetoric of Empire* focused specifically on the lineage from the anthropological and literary discourse such as identified by Said to contemporary and current journalism, analyzing “the survival of colonial discourse in the postcolonial era” (p. 61). Journalism relies on the use of myth, symbol and metaphor, despite conventional expectations of objectively recording fact, and Spurr has identified twelve non-exclusive tropes in colonial-era travel writing that continue to manifest themselves in current journalism practices. By positioning excerpts from late-nineteenth century imperialist writing next to examples from reports on Africa, Asia and Latin America in the 1980s, Spurr made a strong argument for the continuity of colonial thinking, writing, and policymaking on the three continents. He cautioned, however, that “there is nothing especially conscious or intentional in their [the tropes] use; they are part of the landscape in which relations of power manifest themselves” (p. 3).

These ever-shifting relationships between writing, representation, knowledge, violence, power, resistance, and domination are obscure, undertheorized areas of journalism studies. Colonial discourse analysis begins to unpack the lineage and uses of modern values, charting modernity through the three subordinate continents and offering Westerners a chance to comprehend our practices through this tricontinental perspective. Spurr's analysis has positioned the practice of journalism in this relationship between knowledge and power. Drawing from Derrida, Spurr argued that there is a metaphorical relationship between the writer and the colonizer: "For the colonizer as for the writer, it becomes a question of establishing authority through the demarcation of identity and difference" (p. 7). A rhetorical, rather than purely historical, analysis of colonialism attempts to describe how the power of ruling ideas hold sway even after the end of direct domination and continue to influence social reality. Colonialism was a specific historical mode of imperialism. "In speaking of the *discourse* of colonialism, however, the distinction tends to collapse, since the basic principles of this discourse, rooted in the very foundations of Western culture, also constitute the discourse of imperialism. Imperialism has survived the formal ending of colonial rule, but so has colonial discourse" (p. 5). This approach allowed Spurr to draw similarities between the language/power of nineteenth century travel writers and that of reporters covering the economic conditions of Africa or wars and elections in Central America in the 1980s.

Finally, there is an inherent instability in colonial discourse that stems from its localization – its only real center of discourse being the maintenance of authority. This center changes its vision over time and context:

The intense and localized colonial administration of fifty years ago, for example, has shifted to a more indirect and global supervision of Third World political and

economic development. Colonial discourse thus does not simply reproduce an ideology or a set of ideas that must constantly be repeated. It is rather a way of creating and responding to reality that is infinitely adaptable in its function of preserving the basic structure of power. (p. 11)

Spurr's twelve tropes, each briefly described below, provide a means of tracking colonial discourse as it changes over time and context, in order to better identify hegemonic shifts in ideology and power.

Surveillance

Inspecting from a privileged position, the gaze is the "active instrument" of construction, destruction, order and arrangement. Spurr has called this the "commanding view," referring to the literal position – physically and institutionally – of nineteenth century travel writers' top-of-the-hill perspective on the non-Western colonial world. "The commanding view is an originating gesture of colonization itself, making possible the exploration and mapping of territory which serves as the preliminary to a colonial order" (p. 16). Drawing on Foucault's panopticon discussion, Spurr argued that this view engages in a "disproportionate economy of sight" that confers power on the journalist, placed above or at the center of events and yet apart from any indigenous system of values. There is no position for an answering gaze of the Other. The journalist's selective process is tuned for scenes that carry an interest for Western audiences. In the nineteenth century colonial world, the predominant interest was landscape, which was consistently aestheticized, invested with a destiny of material and symbolic richness, and subordinated to the authority of the writer/colonizer. In a postcolonial environment, the commanding view still assumes the journalist's authority over the scene, but the tone tends to be one of disappointment and disillusion rather than the earlier era's optimistic free-for-all.

Although Spurr's focus was on the continuity of colonial discourse through time, it is not a rigid structuralist approach to language. His approach is capable of grasping the change that signals hegemonic shifts: "And we move," he noted, "from robust nineteenth-century ideals of progress and civilization to a modernist sensibility that defines itself in terms of impotence, anxiety, and loss" (p. 23). Both characterizations of the world place the Western system of values at the center, and the non-Western world as an object of study or a place in need of development and action.

Appropriation

The claiming of territory as the colonizer's own also changes shape in the postcolonial world, while retaining its fundamental power. The desire for colonial intervention has traditionally been placed onto the colonized object itself, whether that object be a natural resource that needs utilization or an indigenous people who need the restoration of order. Ideologically, colonization becomes "a gesture of 'human solidarity' which unites the intellectual and moral qualities of Europe with the material wealth of the tropics" (p. 29). Native peoples are gathered into the fold, morally improved and edified, embracing the institutions of their conquerors and thus protected. What ends up being protected, however, is not the indigenous and their ways of life, but rather the new values they have embraced. Via policing power, the indigenous are protected *from themselves*. Materialistically, this amounted to the colonizer's protection from resistance by the colonized. "Colonial intervention thus responds to a threefold calling: that of nature, which calls for the wise use of its resources; that of humanity, which calls for universal betterment; and that of the colonized, who call for protection from their own ignorance and violence" (p. 34).

The end of direct domination heightens the need to find signs of sympathy and identification of non-Westerners to Western values, such as consumerist impulses, competition for development, or espousals of the principles of democracy. This last form, Spurr argued, is most insidious as a colonialism of political theory presented as anti-colonialism. Humanitarian claims to identify Jeffersonian principles in peoples that are unjustly oppressed by Western forces, such as in Vietnam or Iraq, simply remain what Derrida labels “ethnocentrism thinking itself as anti-ethnocentrism” (quoted in Spurr, p. 39). The sympathies have shifted in these humanitarian outcries, but the rhetorical strategies of appropriation remain with us.

Aestheticization

Subjects are imagined to have inherent aesthetic qualities, such as the exotic, grotesque or elemental. The suffering and chaos that seems so representative of the peoples of the three continents is often interpreted as resulting from a lack of law, reason and development; “hence the fascination with religious fanaticism, bloodthirsty dictators, and tribal atrocities” (p. 46). In news reporting on foreign affairs, this trope can be seen in the productive tension between chaos and order as a script played out over and over, making social reality an “object of beauty, horror, pleasure, and pity” (p. 59). Spurr cautioned that this trope is ambiguous, as it can also be liberating when used in a manner that reevaluates the relation between cultures and suggests different ways of living and thinking.

Classification

This trope classifies indigenous peoples according to Western standards of political and technological development. A powerful example of this trope is the classification of socialist, anti-colonial, or anti-imperial rhetoric as outdated or an

electoral grab for votes in tricontinental nations. This trope employs a condescending tone and admonishment of alleged failures; a single standard of progress to measure all nations by; and a hierarchical and linear classification of nations according to their success or failure in meeting this standard. All three are rooted in the social Darwinism of the Victorian era, extending into the language of colonial administration and the current ideology of modernization. “Within the realm of discourse, classification performs this policing function, assigning positions, regulating groups, and enforcing boundaries” (p. 63). Both authoritarian and humanitarian – even classical Marxist – discourse perform this knowledge/power of idealizing linear progress. That modernization is desirable and beneficial continues to underlie the news media’s perception of history.

Debasement

This is the emphasis on the negative end of the Western value system. Here, the base representations imposed upon an individual subject in need of civilized refinement is extended to the entire social system. Repetition of undesirable characteristics serves to justify intervention as well as reiterate the fundamental distinction between colonizer and colonized. This trope also includes the paradox of reviling others for their non-Western ways, yet ridiculing those who attempt to imitate. Lastly, the baseness projected onto the colonized subject produces a fear of contamination that includes biological, as well as social and psychological threats, such as the “dystopian view of vast social movements that threaten civilization itself” (p. 91).

Negation

The colonized are represented as an emptiness or nothingness waiting to be filled. This negation presents an imperative for intervention, or rather justifies conquest

as non-conquest – if there is nothing there (laws, boundaries, sentiment) then filling the void is not conquest. As is the case with other tropes, a more current modernist perspective displaces the opportunism of the colonial era with modern angst over the lost opportunity or impossibility. The value of modernity itself remains unquestioned; in fact, it is the loss of that value that is mourned. In the “absence of foreign investment, of social experimentation, and of strategic importance,” the three continents “remain nonetheless an empty space: not, this time, as the original void awaiting a fulfilling presence, but rather as a postcolonial waste land, the empty sign of unfulfilled desires” (p. 97).

Affirmation

Faced with the “nothingness,” the discourse of colonialism shows a tendency to idealize Western society as one of civilization, humanity, science and progress. The mere affirmation of the existence of these ideals, located in Western society, generates power over that which is labeled non-Western. This trope is familiar as the “White Man’s Burden,” which refers to the Westerner’s duty to civilize (modernize) the rest of the world. Interestingly, this phrase was poeticized and popularized by Rudyard Kipling as the opportunity for an Anglo-Saxon imperial mission after the defeat of the Spanish by the U.S. in 1898. “If we were to identify a characteristically American style of self-affirmation,” Spurr claimed, “it would have to include the notions of material prosperity and moral progress granted by a somewhat secularized Providence, often embodied in Nature....For [Ralph Waldo] Emerson, moral and material progress are inseparably bound in the same evolutionary process” (p. 117). In today’s world, this trope underlies the familiar American values of exporting democracy, investment, development, infrastructure, trade, and prompt and effective codes of law. Unrest, chaos and anti-

American rhetoric in the three continents are understood as people failing to understand the U.S.'s benevolent intentions to wean people from their self-destructive traditions and addictive reliance on the state. This trope often takes the form of an analogy that blends maternal care and therapeutic metaphors.

Idealization

This trope captures the tradition of the “noble savage” in Western thought. During the era of high imperialism and colonialism at the turn of the nineteenth century, Romanticism emerged as a vein of resistance to the rationalist and instrumentalist view of progress in the Western imagination. Faced with this crass view of progress and its destructive force on non-Western social fabrics, this resistance compensated on a symbolic level “by representing individual instances of courage, beauty, and spiritual transcendence, Western writing about the Third World offers a kind of substitute gratification for what would otherwise be an overwhelming sense of loss” (p. 132). In more recent reporting, Spurr has located the contemporary form in representations of poverty as “the way to human and spiritual fulfillment (p. 134), or debates over authenticity that distinguish between the idealized “bush-native” indigenous, the Westernized indigenous, and the European settler. The limitation of these sympathies that defines them as part of colonial discourse is that they stop short of crossing cultural boundaries. What ends up being idealized in colonial discourse is not an alternate symbolic universe – other ways of imagining life – but rather Western virtues. This representation of the noble savage becomes a dialogue of the West with itself over its own contradictory values; the savage remains an instrument.

Insubstantialization

The unfamiliar, ethereal, shimmering, overwhelming or dangerous qualities of the three continents for the Western travel writer or journalist transform the experience of the society into an inner journey of a psychological or spiritual quest for the writer. Yet again, the society and its people become a backdrop for a Western dialogue with itself. “The specifically ideological nature of this sensibility [of the threat of madness] can be seen where the inner conflict of the subject displaces those conflicts taking place outwardly, in the actual arenas of human practice” (p. 148). The strange or unreal aspects of the exterior world are projected internally as an unreality or instability of the writer’s own thoughts. This unreal quality is then projected back onto the setting – stripping it of reality.

Naturalization

Nature is possibly one of the most ambivalent, multidimensional and contradictory concepts in the Western imagination. “The concept of nature,” Spurr claimed, “stands for an empty space in the discourse, ready to be charged with any one of a number of values: nature as abundance, as absence, as original innocence, as unbridled destruction, as eternal cycle, as constant progression” (p. 168). This floating signifier is also interchangeable with the three continents and their peoples in colonial discourse. Naturalizing the three continents places them in opposition to modernization, pragmatically granting dominion over the former by the latter. Colonial discourse naturalizes in two ways, according to Spurr: it identifies colonized people as part of the natural world then presents this identification as a natural state of affairs. In other words, it naturalizes the naturalization. Previous journalism studies, as noted above, criticize the news media for representing the Third World as a place of human and

natural chaos and disaster. Spurr's analysis adds a historical and analytical depth to this criticism, tracing the lineage and vested interests back to colonialism as well as pointing out that the equation of socio-political unrest with natural disasters obscures this lineage, making political upheaval appear natural, cyclical, inevitable, rather than an effect of global human relationships of power that can be changed.

Eroticization

Spurr's analysis of the feminization of colonized nations and peoples deals primarily with the concept of "unveiling," which does not apply directly to the contexts of Latin America for the purposes of this study. Two aspects of this trope, however, may prove illuminating in the following analysis. First, Spurr has argued that the concept of unveiling "serves as a visual metaphor for ideas of opening and discovery everywhere made implicit in the discourse" (p. 175). This sexualized metaphor applies to landscapes and nature as well. Second, he identifies a rhetorical mode of serialization in colonial discourse that regulates populations, making them uniform, interchangeable and "deprived of a subjective personal identity" (p. 175). These aspects reflect the complex historical intimacy between concepts of colonialism, gender, race, nature and power.

Resistance

Finally, Spurr identified the presence of resistance in the form of questioning the underlying assumptions of the colonizer's discourse. This trope is truly rare and difficult to differentiate from the humanitarian modes of thinking that fail to take a perspective of the colonized, as those discussed above. Referring to Foucault's concept of discourse as the juncture between knowledge and power, Spurr noted that for Foucault, this juncture is imperfect: "discourse can be not only an instrument or an effect of power, but also a point of *resistance*" (p. 184; emphasis in original). Getting beyond colonial discourse

will require a constant attempt to understand the discursive structures of colonial power that underscore the positioning of power in today's postcolonial world, as well as resist and reevaluate the values that contribute to oppression across the world. Because colonial discourse is not a stable, unified structure, but rather shifts and modifies over time, resistance to colonial categories and viewpoints is always possible and happening. Spurr argued that this takes place in journalism when: a) ideological language is questioned from a non-Western point of view, such as the term "terrorism;" b) the conditions of observation that allow the journalist a particular vantage point are questioned; c) non-objectivity on the part of the journalist is acknowledged and discussed; and d) other voices and perspectives are present. I hope to find such examples in its sample of U.S. discourse on Venezuela.

In this analysis, I will apply postcolonial approaches to the U.S. political discourse on Venezuela in order to better understand "the ways in which the Western realities have spread across the world as the universal condition" (Shome & Hedge, 2002, p. 261), particularly the realities of modernization, development and the nation-state in a post-Cold war era. As is hopefully clear by now, this study is not simply about what elites think about Venezuelan politics and presidents. I hope to use the analytical tools described above to analyze how this particular communication maintains certain shared beliefs of our society as we continually define and shape the processes of globalization and development. As Carey (1988) has argued, "social life is more than power and trade...it also includes the sharing of aesthetic experience, religious ideas, personal values and sentiments, and intellectual notions – a ritual order" (p. 34). Rather than being imposed by force, consensus is often achieved through familiar narratives, metaphors and myths that, in Barthes' (1957/1972) words, naturalize social norms as

common sense by “transforming history into nature” (p. 129). In light of the contributions of postcolonial theorists, the role of the U.S. press in transforming colonial history into the natural progress of globalization deserves careful scrutiny.

METHOD

Approaches to Discourse Analysis

An increasingly common method of ideological analysis of mass media texts is called Critical Discourse Analysis, often abbreviated as CDA. This method, derived from the field of linguistics, analyzes connections between discourse and hegemony that are reflective of and also influences social structures and power relationships (Fairclough, 1989). Unfortunately, the micro-linguistic analyses that often result from this method tend to lack substantial historical and material contextualization, assuming social practices rather than explaining the connection between the practices and the language (Fowler, 1996). The end result too often resembles a list of grammatical and lexical features without an explanation of how their use interacts with social structures.

Jones and Collins (2006) have provided an illuminating, if rather biting, critique of Critical Discourse Analysis, as embodied in the work of its leading practitioner, Norman Fairclough, comparing its potential with a more broad approach of political analysis. Generally, the authors agree with Fairclough's insistence that: a) linguistics is relevant to political and ideological critique; b) language is a primary medium for power; c) a dialectical relationship exists between discourse and social structures; and d) class struggle and Marxist theory is central to an understanding of this relationship. They questioned, however, the rigidity of a structuralist approach such as CDA as well as its inability to incorporate various social theories and empirical facts into a complex process of generating new understandings about discourse and power. Drawing out the implications of these limitations, Jones and Collins provided a tongue-in-cheek Critical

Discourse Analysis of one of Fairclough's arguments, resulting in a list of linguistic features from the text that convey the exact opposite of Fairclough's meaning.

They concluded that "formal constructs of grammatical description are altogether unsuitable vehicles for the difficult intellectual labor of meaningful political critique" (Jones & Collins, 2006, p. 40). CDA, or other structuralist linguistic approaches, loses its critical function because it ends up placing the action or responsibility on the language itself, rather than people, media ownership, political and economic allegiances, editorial and management practices, etc. It is the analysis of practices, contexts, and histories that gives discourse analysis its critical substance, and Jones and Collins maintained that complex political analysis cannot, or should not, be avoided. "The understanding and interpretation," they argued, "of what the relevant or significant communicational forms, meanings, and patterns are in a particular situation or event is something that emerges in the course of detailed empirical investigation of the relevant event in all its complexity" (p. 42).

It is the intention of my analysis of *The New York Times* editorials to engage in such a critique by focusing not simply on the *language*, but the *discourse* surrounding this context: the relationships between various Venezuelan and U.S. administrations, the relationships between Venezuela and other imperial powers, the relationships between the U.S. and the Old World empires, the relationships between humans and nature that make up so much of colonial history and the postcolonial situation. All of this "everything else that is going on" (Jones & Collins, 2006, p. 47) is a necessary part of an analysis of the interactions between people, language, power and hegemony.

Selecting the Articles

Scholars have previously asserted the influence of the news media, especially the prestige press, on U.S. foreign policy. The press in this instance has a close and intricate relationship with political elites and policymakers (Cohen, 1963). *The New York Times* is of particular significance to foreign policy as the newspaper is committed to international news, and its coverage is often used to inform members of Congress about the state of the world (Berry, 1990; Weiss, 1974). *The New York Times* also has an influence on other new media's coverage of foreign policy (Carragee, 2003). The powerful influence of this coverage ultimately affects public opinion at large (McNelly & Izcaray, 1992; Salwen & Matera, 1989; Semetko, et al., 1992; Wanta & Hu, 1993; Wanta, et al., 2004). Even if the readership of international news in *The New York Times* seems narrow, the effects can be widespread. The editors' opinions put forward by this newspaper largely reflect and legitimize the mainstream terms of public debate in the U.S. on matters of foreign policy. Although this sample admittedly covers only the elite portion of the U.S. public sphere, it is this portion that remains so influential in setting the terms of public debate, especially over foreign policy. Given this caveat, this sample provides fairly broad access to the range of discourse on the Venezuelan political situation across multiple media spheres.

In this study, I will analyze editorials in *The New York Times* on the topic of Venezuela from 1897 to the present day in 2007. The year 1897 captures the buildup to and debate over the Spanish-American war of 1898, when the U.S. joined the Old World as an overseas colonial power. Eighteen-ninety-seven also marks a significant transition in U.S. journalism, when a choice crystallized between William Randolph Hearst's activist, or "yellow," journalism and the rise of *The New York Times* as the "moral

counterweight” of sober objectivity (Campbell, 2004). The time frame of the next 110 years provides ample historical space through which to chart the presence, absence and changes in colonial discourse in this prestigious U.S. newspaper.

In the interest of space, the sample focuses on three time periods throughout the century that generated the most discussion of Venezuela in the *Times*. The “Colonial Era” covers 1897 through 1908, a period during which the U.S. decidedly replaced the European powers as the dominant force in the Latin American region. The “Cold War Era” marks the transition in the world to a postcolonial, or neocolonial, order, covering 1958 through 1968. The “Current Era” includes the previous decade of socialist government in Venezuela, from 1998 to the present. These 33 years represent 174 of the 242 relevant articles (or roughly 70 percent) published during the previous 110 years.

The 242 editorials were accumulated in two searches. First, I searched the “ProQuest Historical Newspapers: *The New York Times* (1851-2003)” database for the term “Venezuela” and article type “Editorial.” This produced 222 of the 242 relevant articles. I then searched the Lexis-Nexis database for the years 2004 through 2007 for the terms “Venezuela” and “Editorial.” This produced the remaining 20 editorials in the sample. Afterwards, the sample was sized down to the above-mentioned 174 *New York Times* editorials.

ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION

In these 174 editorials, I found strong evidence of continuity of colonial discourse throughout the century, as well as more subtle shifts in particular uses of some metaphors and tropes. In general, the fundamental drama of Western civilization in its struggle against barbarity dominated *The New York Times'* understanding of Venezuela throughout the century. This ongoing battle of knowledge, technology, and moral prudence against the forces of primitivity, backwardness, and human nature defines the Western conception of the Self and the Other – of US and Them. It is through the continual reproduction of these categories that the *Times* explained the international politics between Venezuela and the United States to its readers.

Beyond this overarching narrative of Civilization (US) versus Barbarism (Them), Spurr's (1993) tropes of colonial discourse proved analytically valuable in teasing out the finer manifestations of this understanding and its implications in the case of Venezuela. Of the twelve tropes of colonial discourse discussed above, eight were prominently represented in the editorials. I argue here that evidence of the first tropes presented below – Surveillance, Appropriation, Aestheticization, and Classification – performed the discursive work of defining, assigning, setting the stage and categorizing that produces a part of the world (US) that has evolved into civilization and must lead the way for the rest (Them). Subsequently, the remaining four tropes – Debasement, Negation, Affirmation and Naturalization – reinforced the vibrant characterizations that are critical to an understanding of the morality and inevitability of modernization as the triumph of good over evil. As is the case with imperial ideologies, the end results materially and

culturally reside in the interests of maintaining Euroamerican dominance over the rest of the world.

Examples of each trope and any supportive metaphors are analyzed below for each time period – Colonial, Cold War and Current. The final subsection of the analysis addresses the potential for resistance against colonialist understandings in *The New York Times*, although as the evidence suggests, this resistance plays a minimal role in the general editorializing.

Delineation Tropes

In the context of Venezuela in the *Times*, the first four tropes, which I group as “delineation tropes,” position a politically and economically civilized United States as the promoter of reason, justice, law, impartiality, peace, prosperity, humanity and progress. Throughout each era, these assumptions about U.S. culture support arguments for intervention in Venezuela’s law and economy. Due to the *Times*’ appropriation of these values for the U.S., intervention is always understood as benevolent, neutral and humanitarian, resembling earlier civilizing missions of French imperialism. For the various editors throughout the century, the instruments and policies of free trade are unabashedly promoted as the tools with which the hemisphere can achieve the highest order of a fair civil society.

Surveillance

From a “commanding view,” the writer, journalist, or in this case the editorial board of the most prestigious international news source in the world, inspects, orders and arranges the world for their fellow readers and policymakers. The broad descriptions of what is important, valuable and worthy – even what it is that is *happening* – is analogous to the exploration and mapping so vital to establishing the

colonial order. The descriptions define without incorporating the “answering gaze” of the Other. Ownership and authority is constructed and destructed by categorizing, drawing lines and defining. The Colonial Era, always more smug and derogatory in tone than the later half of the century, shows an insistence by the *Times* on the superiority of a civilized legal system over the more barbaric method of war in international relations, discursively reinforcing the emergence of the U.S. as an impartial and peaceful superpower. In the Cold War Era, the triumph of moderate democracy in Venezuela serves as a distinctive mark of civilization. By the end of the century, the promotion of law and democracy combine with a more emphatic promotion of U.S. economic policy to outline the hemispheric need for continued intervention.

Colonial Era. Three main situations that involved Venezuela were commented on by *The New York Times* from the period of 1897 through 1908. The first situation addressed a boundary dispute between an independent Venezuela and the neighboring British territory of Guiana; the second concerned the possibility of Germany and Great Britain going to war with Venezuela to collect its international debt; the third dealt with the ownership rights of an American asphalt company and a French cable company contested by the Venezuelan government. All three situations centered on a discussion of the role of arbitration as a means superior to war and violence in settling international disputes. “It’s not too late to arbitrate,” argued the *Times* (“Arbitration,” 1902, p. 8). Understanding the trope of surveillance makes visible the discursive work, coming from the U.S., of this period in drawing the boundary lines between a civilized, global legal system that promises a future of peace and stability and a barbarous, unjust and antiquated use of force that only produces violence and chaos. “The determination of this vexed question,” claimed the *Times*, “is chiefly of importance and interest to the

United States as an illustration of the superiority of arbitration over war as a method of settling international disputes" ("Victory," 1899, p. 8). Such a "broad, humane, wise principle" is presented as "one that should control civilized nations," ultimately resulting in "the submission of an international contention to the test of reason and justice rather than of violence" (ibid). This "important and valuable page in history" ("Page," 1897, p. 6) appears to be a hegemonic shift that discursively separates the ugly, brutal use of Old World colonial force from a more sophisticated and methodical form of domination via a system of arbitration.

The metaphor that history is a book frequently appears in this period of the *Times'* editorials: "records of history" ("Venezuela Arbitration," 1899, p. 6), "page of history" ("Page," 1897, p. 6), "chapter of history" ("Chapter," 1901, p. 6). It emphasizes a linear knowledge of history at the expense of a more cyclical one. Previous chapters document the past, but to discover what is to be, one must move ahead to the end. One must move always toward the future. Corollaries of this understanding of history are that the past cannot be changed, that the future is something new and better, that history has an authoritative author, and that the written text assumes authority over oral tradition.

This metaphor has implications for the imposition of arbitration as a global system. In order to defend a claim in international court, a responsible and honorable nation must submit to "a careful review of the testimony of the maps and authorities...evidence...reports and documents...proof" ("Page," 1897, p. 6). In order to win in court, a nation must in the first place *possess* these sorts of documentation and "proof." The rights of ownership are broadly defined as an issue of what arguments and evidence make sense in a "civilized" court of law. This assumes first that the more

civilized notion of arbitration can be separated from the brutal use of force, historically or even in the present day, and second that ownership is assigned to individuals according to a written page or code. In addition, the assumption that the legal code is the just and impartial use of reason highlights the principle of neutrality, the voluntary nature of participation, and the fairness of the arbitration process. It obscures, however, the vested interests involved in lawmaking, the role of social status in the courtroom, and the use of force required to support a legal system. These powerful and definitive assumptions remain cloaked in and obscured by the incontestable notion that a fair and impartial trial is preferable to bloodshed and tyranny.

How do fairness and impartiality make sense in this shifting world, when a South American republic is pitted against the British Empire in a land or debt dispute in international court? For *The New York Times*, this David and Goliath match-up could only be remedied through the intervention of the United States acting on behalf of Venezuela in court. Here we see the manner in which the U.S.'s burgeoning role as an international superpower is understood by the elite newspaper as a progressive, mechanical solution to an age-old problem: "From that moment we began to assert our own position in the matter with greater and increasing firmness, and forces were set in motion that urged the ancient dispute forward swiftly to its peaceful settlement" ("Chapter," 1901, p. 6). The implications of this new global position for the U.S. reinforce the dominance of the emerging superpower over the hemisphere: "The whole incident sufficiently indicates the Herculean nature of the labors which the President of the United States has shown his willingness to assume in not only guaranteeing but enforcing the good behavior of all the republics to the south of us, from the Rio Grande to Cape Horn" ("Venezuela," 1905, p. 6). Rather than encouraging solidarity between the

American republics in resisting the imperial Old World “Goliaths,” the role of the U.S. in representing sovereign Venezuela in international arbitration places the U.S. in a position of power over European empires as well as Latin American republics.

The interplay of the concepts of civilized arbitration, progress, and good behavior ultimately defines and categorizes the entire hemisphere as economic opportunity for the United States. The *Times* argued that the U.S.’s role in “developing orderly and progressive government” in Venezuela “is the establishment of substantial free trade” with the region:

Such a policy would instantly tend to *stimulate the prosperity* of the countries, *make openings* for the profitable investment of American and other capital and *create a growing class* deeply interested in orderly administration. Certainly *prosperity, agricultural, industrial, and commercial activity* are the conditions precedent to the *progress* of the countries in *civilization*, and these would be promoted by the *emancipation of trade*. (“Muddle,” 1903, p. 8, emphasis added)

Courts of law and international arbitration constituted the first steps to mapping the ownership rights and legal responsibilities vital to implementing “free” trade in the hemisphere.

Cold War Era. In the mid-century, another linear metaphor of a “long, hard, uphill journey” (“Democracy at Work,” 1958, p. 26) of Latin America toward civilization begins to show other familiar “landmarks” of progress (“Venezuelan Campaign,” 1958, p. 36; “Venezuela’s New,” 1959, p. 20). The focus of the *Times* shifted from legal systems to Venezuela’s political system. Venezuelan history before the 1958 democratic election was characterized by *The New York Times* as a veritable dark ages of uncivilized dictatorship, during which the “fabulous wealth” of Venezuela’s petroleum resources was squandered on “a few favored characters” and “unnecessary luxuries” (“Tragedy,” 1965, p. 20). The *Times* boasted that “under President Betancourt all that was changed” and surveys the blossoming opportunities across the land in the light of Western standards:

Venezuela today boasts of being the *richest country in the world* because of her *oil*, her *minerals* and her reserves of currency and *gold* (\$870 million for a population of 8,500,000). Her *per capita income* of about \$1,150 is the *highest in Latin America*. *Foreign investments* total about \$5 billion and are increasing. The *budget* is in surplus and the *foreign debt* is being reduced. ("Tragedy," 1965, p. 20, emphasis added)

The most important feat of Venezuela's democracy for the *Times* was its continuing resistance to Cuban-style revolution. The *Times* assessed Venezuelan democracy "from a hemispheric point of view," concluding that "the supreme importance of the Betancourt Government is that it is trying to make a social revolution by democratic and evolutionary methods" ("More," 1961, p. 34). Amid resistance to a U.S.-style economic and political structure from Venezuela's left and right, the newspaper made its authoritative prescription for moderation: "What Venezuela needs is time and political stability" (ibid). The newspaper's concept of a free trade-style (r)evolution captures an insidious co-optation of the demand for social justice made by the "masses" and the radical left. The free market was pronounced as the only reasonable and possible means through which social justice could be achieved. The revolutionary demand for justice, however, is a demand for respite from those same free market policies. As is clear in the case of Venezuela's recent history, U.S. economic and democratic prescriptions merely reproduced the vast inequality between a small urban elite and a massive indigent population.

Current Era. By the turn of the century, the *Times'* surveying tone takes on the "modernist sensibility" identified by Spurr (1993) as "impotence, anxiety, and loss" (p. 23), while still propounding moderate politics as the only solution to rampant instability:

Violence is looming in Venezuela. A national strike is crippling its economy. Venezuela, the world's fifth-largest petroleum producer, is starting to run short of oil and food. The demands of President Hugo Chávez and his opponents grow more polarized by the day. *The country desperately needs the two sides to recognize the danger of playing chicken...*

The specific solution matters less than getting the government and opposition to find a mutually agreeable plan. Prospects are dismal. Moderates on both sides are being drowned out by hard-liners. Opposition protests are becoming violent, and the government has ignored court orders and allowed its supporters to ransack opposition media offices. (“Venezuela on the Brink,” 2002, p. A34, emphasis added)

The complete breakdown of law, order, stability, prosperity and peace described here is neither contextualized nor historicized by the editors, who nihilistically and dramatically mourn a loss of opportunity for the hemisphere. There is also continuity from the colonial-era insistence on a civilized legal system instead of the barbarity of war to the current repudiation of violence and antagonism in politics. By framing the overview as a contest between civility and barbarism, the *Times* reproduced the authoritative position of the Western eye over Latin America.

Other editorials surveyed opportunities of the previous decade, when it seemed as if the optimism of the Cold war era had been validated:

It was 11 years ago that Bill Clinton stood on a stage in Miami flanked by the leaders of 33 North and South American countries and proposed a hemispheric free trade agreement that would stretch from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego. The Free Trade Area of the Americas, to be completed by 2005, would be the largest in the world, encompassing 850 million people with \$13 trillion in purchasing power, its backers said. The summit meeting rang with optimistic calls about forging new ties throughout the region. The cold war was over, and with the single exception of Cuba, all of the region’s countries were democracies and believers in open markets, and they were listening to the structural reform dictates of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. (“Free,” 2005, p. A16, emphasis added)

Within a decade, however, and a change in U.S. and Venezuelan governments, the prospects for the hemisphere turned dismal for the *Times*:

Fast forward to yesterday. President Bush was in Mar del Plata, Argentina, being heckled by protesters, not to mention taunts from the Venezuelan president, Hugo Chávez. Mr. Chávez...has decided to use the summit meeting to try to drive a stake through the heart of the free trade agreement. That’s not a tall order; the trade pact is not even on the barest of life-support these days. (“Free,” 2005, p. A16, emphasis added)

Throughout the *Times'* century-long survey of the nation of Venezuela and its “chief” importance” to the U.S., one ambition remained clear and steady for the prestigious newspaper – the goal of establishing a U.S.-style free trade system for the entire hemisphere. Civilization and progress remained defined for *The New York Times* as free trade and the legal and behavioral codes that support it.

By the end of the century, the *Times* metaphorically conceptualized the hemisphere as a neighborhood. Its understanding of an international neighborhood – “stirring trouble in the neighborhood” (“Venezuela’s Political,” 2002, p. A26); “next door in Colombia” (“Beleaguered,” 2002, p. A26) – emphasizes the need for a neighborhood watch policy while trivializing the power exerted by the U.S. in the hemisphere – “a new understanding with the neighborhood superpower” (“Backtracking,” 2003, p. A14). This emergent metaphor seems to eschew earlier instrumentalist and domineering understandings of the international relationships between the U.S. and Latin America and to present the U.S. as an interested neighbor with benevolent intentions, in effect “cloaking” the authoritative tone of the commanding view.

Appropriation

The desire for colonial intervention and imposition of the Western ways of life were often placed on the colonial object itself in colonial discourse. The appropriation of land, natural resources and people in the colonized territories of Asia, Latin America, and Africa occurs concomitantly with an appropriation of the desires, wants and needs of the colonized. Colonial intervention, appropriation, and assumption of authority is presented as a response to the call for the wise use of natural resources, for the betterment of humanity, and for protection of the colonized from themselves (Spurr, 1993). As Spurr has argued, “colonial discourse takes over as it takes cover” (p. 28). The

trope of appropriation was employed fairly consistently in the *Times*' discourse on Venezuela over the century, ranging from expression of the benevolent and modernizing role of capital for natural resources (crops at first, then oil) to the equivocation of the desire for democracy with desire for U.S. economic policy to the need to save Venezuelans from regressing to dictatorship. In each era, the Venezuelans are in danger of succumbing to their natural backwardness without the intervention and investments of the Western world.

Colonial Era. The abundance of natural resources in the tropics of Central and South America was of primary concern for many U.S. entrepreneurs at the turn of the nineteenth century. For Westerners, this immense tropical material wealth was considered wasted without Western knowledge and skills in extracting and utilizing these resources. The *Times* made these same assumptions in its assessment of events in the region. According to the editors, as a result of the arbitration decision over the boundary dispute with Great Britain, Venezuela lost some territory "that was hers by tradition but occupied and improved by Great Britain by the default – through ignorance of or indifference to its value – by Venezuela" ("Venezuela Arbitration," 1899, p. 8). Great Britain, on the other hand, "gets a vast area of land about which Venezuela probably knows nothing except that Great Britain has occupied and developed it until its discovered richness and presumed resources are coveted by Venezuela" (ibid). The colonialist assumption here is that the value of natural resources is determined by its "occupation," "improvement," and "development" by capital. Supplementing that assumption is one that insinuates the ignorant, lazy and immoral nature of the Venezuelan people in matters of progress.

The *Times* explicitly acknowledged the interests of the U.S. – who represented Venezuela at the arbitration proceedings in Paris – in “discovering” and developing Latin America’s natural resources: “Under the protection of just laws and friendly Governments the money of citizens of the United States would accomplish wonders in opening up the resources and augmenting the national wealth of these [Latin American] republics” (“Trouble,” 1901, p. 6). In a peaceful and stable world of just laws and amicable governments, the investments of the U.S. are imagined to benefit all involved by extracting resources and making the Latin American nations wealthy.

In reality, this process was met with resistance from Venezuelans that the *Times* interpreted as characteristic ignorance, violence and chaos. In colonial discourse, in order to further the “universal betterment” of humanity, the indigenous must be protected from themselves and educated and reformed to desire peace and prosperity (Spurr, 1993). The assumed natural tendencies of non-Westerners toward ignorance and chaos permeated the *Times*’ understanding of international structures and the role of the U.S. within. “We wish,” the *Times* stated, “that the Governments of all the republics of South America could be brought to understand what almost irreparable harm they do to their own peoples by their irregular manner of treating just debts. Next to peace and civil order, their chief need is capital to develop their resources” (“Venezuela,” 1902, p. 8). Here, the editorial combined the duty to expropriate and develop natural resources with the civilizing mission to protect Latin Americans from their natural tendencies. This second element locates the desire to be “civilized” within the dominated group:

The Venezuelans ought to see, however, that they are their own worst enemies. Their Castros and their revolutions are a bar to the commercial progress of their country, and they prevent its taking a respectable place in the family of nations. The greatest blessing that could happen to them would be the coming into power of a Venezuelan Diaz, strong enough to maintain civil order and wise

enough to give the Venezuelans a Government they would earnestly desire to perpetuate. (“Holland,” 1908, p. 8, emphasis added)

The “Díaz” referenced in this passage refers to Mexico’s notorious dictator Porfirio Díaz, against whom the famous Mexican Revolution of 1910 was fought and won. The economic interests of the U.S. in friendly dictators in Latin America – as opposed to unfriendly ones, such as Venezuela’s Cipriano Castro – historically diminished only in the face of mounting criticism from Latin Americans of the U.S.’s hypocrisy in supporting dictators in American republics.

Cold War Era. By the time Venezuelans revolted against their last dictator, Pérez Jiménez, this hegemonic shift was taking place in the U.S.’s political approach to Latin America, and the *Times* displayed a new form of appropriation cloaked in the discourse of democracy versus Communist tyranny. The ignorance and violence previously assumed of the Venezuelan people in general was transposed onto Communists in particular, and the Venezuelans were positioned as desiring respite from this violence and ignorance so that they may instead focus on matters of progress, development and economic prosperity.

The 1958 election itself was positioned as the chance for Venezuelans to express their desires and choose their international destiny – to prove “that Latin-American countries regaining their freedom know how to use it with restraint and honesty...History is offering Venezuela a great opportunity and it is gratifying to see that the chances of this opportunity being seized are good” (“Opportunity,” 1958, p. 36). In an orderly democratic election, the Venezuelans achieved their civility and were gathered into the fold to fight against barbarism. The *Times* triumphantly claimed that “the real victory belongs to the Venezuelan people” and assured Americans that “it is clear that the voters want an orderly and peaceful succession” (ibid). In their clear, moderate, and civil

rejection of the left and the right, Venezuelans have, according to the *Times*, expressed their preference for U.S. policy: “The vote for democracy is a vote for a peaceful transformation of Venezuela’s economic and social system along the lines of the Alliance for Progress” (“Victory,” 1963, p. 42).

The equivocation between Venezuela’s “vote for democracy” and U.S. President Kennedy’s new investment plan for Latin America, known as the Alliance for Progress, is an example of the placing of desire for colonial intervention onto the colonized subject that characterizes the trope of appropriation in colonial discourse. Firstly, the *Times* outlined the natural resources that require wise utilization and chart the course for the universal betterment of mankind:

The dictatorship of General Pérez Jiménez, like all dictatorships, left an economic and fiscal crisis and a political ferment that *need wise and firm direction*. Venezuela has been *blessed with a natural wealth in her oil and minerals* that offers a guarantee for the future, *but the economy of the country must be nurtured and diversified*. The immense income from petroleum was *never spread out among the Venezuelan masses*. The common lot was *poverty, illiteracy and ill-health*. *Agrarian reforms, manufacturing industries, schools, roads, housing, irrigation and other public works must be accomplished*. *The past was dark but the future is bright*. (“Venezuela’s New,” 1959, p. 20, emphasis added)

Secondly, they identified the Venezuelan people as the source of desire for the U.S. economic plans: “Mr. Kennedy and the Latin-American leaders have made clear that the only adequate answer to the Cuban challenge is to bring about the social reforms and economic development now demanded by the masses and by the articulate middle classes in Latin America” (“Latin-American,” 1961, p. E8).

In the face of Communist violence, backwardness, and ignorance, the Venezuelan people eagerly turned, according to the *Times*, to the U.S. for assistance in building a nation – especially its economy – in the Western image. According to the *Times*, a journey to South America made by President Kennedy “could not have worked out more

satisfactorily. The absence of any incident, the warmth of the crowds, the right kind of publicity for the Alliance for Progress plan, the obviously fruitful conversations with the Presidents of Venezuela and Colombia, and the happy impression made by President and Mrs. Kennedy added up to a virtually perfect score” (“At Journey’s,” 1961, p. 32). The editors optimistically concluded that the “weekend trip is valuable, but it can only be the beginning” (ibid). This conclusion paves the way toward further U.S. intervention in Venezuela’s political and economic progress. In contrast to the previous dark days of violence and chaos, “peace can be won in Venezuela with the help of the United States and other members of the Organization of American States. Peace is essential if the victory of the Venezuelan people is to be a lasting one” (“Victory,” 1963, p. 42). Intervention was described in terms of the desirability of peace and prosperity in the region.

As international relations shifted to a postcolonial structure, the metaphor of friendship during this era marks this conceptual shift. Whereas in the colonial era, the concept of friendship, confidence or acquaintance was emphasized repeatedly to describe the diplomatic relationship between the U.S. and European powers – including ones at odds with U.S. policy – the concept of friendship was only applied once in reference to South American republics. During the Cold war era studied here, this changed as Western civilization triumphs in Venezuela. Moreover, expressions such as “take to heart” (“Yankee,” 1958, p. 28), “best wishes of all who have the future of Venezuela at heart” (“Venezuela’s Election,” 1958, p. 38), and “at the heart of the Alliance program” (“President,” 1961, p. 42) emphasized this newfound compassion and solidarity on the journey toward a civilized hemisphere. It downplayed, however, the relationships of power and domination that continue to play a role. Interestingly, by 1998, the concept of

friendship had all but disappeared, possibly due to its being generally outdated or no longer applicable to the nation of Venezuela.

Current Era. As seen with the surveillance trope, prospects for progress have turned dismal and nations are losing the battle for peace, prosperity and civility, and without civility Venezuelans are in danger of becoming victims of themselves.

The extraction of natural resources under the leadership of U.S. entrepreneurs still pointed the way toward civilization and universal betterment. For example, the *Times* pointed out that in 1996, “American companies began to pump major oil deposits from the waters around Equatorial Guinea and production has been rising steadily. If the new oil revenue is managed well, it can educate, heal and provide jobs for the country’s half-million people” (“Petro-Curse,” 2000, p. A18).

However, faced with the global reality that this outcome is perhaps only mythical, a caveat appeared in the discourse that the people of the exploited nations were almost solely responsible for the success or failure to rise with the tide. “But oil brings risks as well as opportunities,” cautioned the *Times*. “Petroleum helps a nation most when its government already has democratic accountability, fiscal discipline and a bureaucracy that is based on merit and is relatively free of corruption.” Norway was used in this editorial as an example of an oil-producing country that “managed its resources wisely” to “broaden the country’s manufacturing base” and sends its “people to college.” Other countries, such as Nigeria, Kuwait, Cameroon, Gabon and Venezuela, suffer from “dictators and their cronies. Oil is particularly corrupting because it is hard to keep track of and easy to turn into cash. It is tempting to spend the sudden windfall on pharaonic works or arms. OPEC countries spend more of their G.N.P. on weapons than do other developing countries” (“Petro-Curse,” 2000, p. A18). The violent, immoral and ignorant

tendencies of tricontinental peoples seem to always overpower the best intentions of U.S. investments.

Unfortunately, according to the *Times*, the ignorance of the Venezuelan people has left them once again susceptible to a devastating dictatorial rule:

President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela – the very portrait of a modern Latin American strongman – is not content to exercise near-total political and military control of his country. Now he is tightening his grip on the Venezuelan economy. That's bad news for foreign investors, but *even more so for the Venezuelan people who will have to pay the price for an economy plagued by increasing inefficiency and corruption.* (“Venezuela Inc.’s,” 2007, p. A22, emphasis added)

After three internationally monitored and approved elections, the *Times* could only assume that the majority of Venezuelans who continues to support Hugo Chávez were merely ignorant victims of demagoguery or fearful victims of their own violent and corrupt leaders.

Either way, they were represented as victims of the failure of hemispheric peace, stability and free trade policies. The only hope for the betterment of mankind and the rescue of the ignorant poor from themselves was, in the tradition of appropriation, U.S. intervention and surveillance:

The [U.S] administration can best advance American interests, *and those of the people of Latin America*, through *more active engagement* of the region's many democracies. It also needs *to press ahead* with trade agreements and other forms of economic assistance and cooperation. That is the *smartest way* to counter Mr. Chávez's demagoguery. (“Venezuela Inc.’s,” 2007, p. A22, emphasis added)

For the *Times*, increased intervention in sovereign Latin American states was understood simply as diplomatic cooperation with the Latin American desire for (U.S.-style) democracy: “Washington policy makers should approach the Andean region as a whole and work alongside other Latin American nations, like Brazil and Mexico, to strengthen democracy in the region” (“Turmoil,” 2003, p. A24).

With the goal in mind of leading the hemisphere in political and economic policy, the failures of particular U.S. administrations did not escape the *Times*' scrutiny. At a Pan-American summit meeting in 2005, President Bush "failed to get even a minimally face-saving outcome at the collapsed trade talks and allowed a loudmouthed opportunist like the president of Venezuela to steal the show" ("President," 2005, p. A26). (The claim that the trade talks collapsed at this summit is itself an ethnocentric assessment that subtly neutralizes the possibility that the talks were successful for other Latin American leaders and participants involved.) In its criticism of the U.S. administration, the *Times* looked to former U.S. president Ronald Reagan for inspiration in turning a "messy second term around" and delivering " – in great part through his own powers of leadership – a historic series of agreements" that brought the Soviet Union into the civilized free market fold (ibid).

Aestheticization

The suffering and chaos that seems so representative of life on the three continents is frequently interpreted as a lack of law, reason and development, and is often presented as a script or a plot played out as a tragedy, suspense or comedy. The effect, Spurr (1993) has argued, is to make the social realities in Africa, Asia and Latin America appeared instead as aesthetic qualities, a narrative, or an "object of beauty, horror, pleasure, and pity" (p. 59). In the case of editorializing on Venezuela, this trope appears to a great extent during the Cold war era, and to a much lesser extent in colonial or current times. The horror of bloodthirsty tyrants and a mindless, violent primitive existence was offset in the colonial era with a ridicule of the banality of this perceived Venezuelan reality. In the mid-century, the horror genre was not especially present so much as the dramatic suspense of a nation on the verge of joining the U.S. in its quest for

hemispheric civility. This dramatic climax subsided with the dramatic decade it occurred in – a decade quite literally dramatized by the proliferation of television and the evening network news – and by the end of the century perhaps a touch of modern nihilism sapped the life out of the plots, dramas, conspiracies and suspense of the previous mid-century era.

Colonial Era. Horror and banality, chaos and order, alternated in the editorials but were underscored with a sense of mockery. The horror of irrational bloodthirstiness appeared occasionally, reminding the *Times*' readers of the obstacles the U.S. faced in the journey toward civilized nation-building among the Other: "If they can get along without it, it will not be long before the people in Central and South America will insist that they shall no longer be kept awake o'nights, or maimed, or slain, to gratify the ambition or greed or bloodthirstiness of professional revolutionists" ("Andrade's," 1899, p. 6). Also present was the naturalness or banality of this script: "The theatrical resignation of Mr. Castro as President of Venezuela is only an added instance of the extreme difficulty of dealing with some of the South American Republics" ("Muddle," 1903, p. 8). A hint of ridicule, however, underlines the horror when the *Times* considered intervention on the part of the U.S. to overthrow Venezuela's dictator: "But, as between nations, one great and one little, such expeditions would partake so much more of the character of opera bouffe than of tragedy that a sense of the ridiculous would prevent a great nation from organizing an expedition to catch Castro" ("Castro and France," 1906, p. 8).

Finally, a metaphor that the Old imperial powers are bullies helped to justify U.S. intervention according to familiar underdog narratives. Great Britain, according to the *Times*, was "a powerful, well-equipped, and resolute antagonist. Venezuela would have

been constrained beyond any shadow of a doubt if she had faced this conflict alone, to yield...as the victorious commander saw fit to demand with the conquered nation” (“Victory,” 1899, p. 8). “Our policy,” stated the *Times*, “will be to discourage a resort to war upon little States for the collection of private debts” (“Venezuela Again,” 1904, p. 6). This narrative of standing up for the small, helpless victim emphasized the humanitarian intentions of the *Times* and, by extension, U.S. It obscured, however, the less-often mentioned economic interests:

Now comes the announcement of blockade as a measure of actual war. That *cuts off all commerce* and necessarily reduces customs receipts to zero....Our merchant ships and the merchant ships of all neutral nations will not be at liberty to enter Venezuelan ports. *Our very considerable trade with that republic must cease...citizens of the United States will be put to serious inconvenience and loss.* (“At War,” 1902, p. 8, emphasis added)

That economic interests are at stake may shed light on why this narrative was not always employed when evidence pointed to its reality. The ambivalent role of the underdog narrative was often hegemonically employed to justify intervention when economic interests were involved.

Cold War Era. A sense of drama, bloodshed, mortal enemies and the victory of democracy heightened during the Cold war era of the 1960’s, and the opera bouffe had transformed into a more sophisticated suspense of a nation on the precarious brink of modernization. This climatic surge came during a decade that U.S. citizens witnessed a nuclear missile crisis, the violent death of a United States president, an escalating and horrific war against Southeast Asia and successful tricontinental resistance to the colonial and imperial structures of power – not to mention the massive civil rights uprisings in their own streets.

Regarding Venezuela, the *Times* characterized the overthrow of a military dictator and the rise to power of an anti-Communist democrat as both a triumph of

civilization in Latin America and a precarious situation on the brink of upset and chaos. “This is more than just a general election in a Latin-American country,” claimed the *Times* on the eve of the election of the U.S.-favored Rómulo Betancourt as president after the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship. “There are drama and history, anxiety, high hopes and intense interest everywhere in the hemisphere” (“Venezuelan Campaign,” 1958, p. 36). After the election, the *Times* described the festivities with which Venezuelans entered the civilized world: “Seldom has the hemisphere seen a more impressive gathering than the throng of men and women who came from all over the world to honor one of Latin America’s most outstanding statesmen and through him to pay tribute to the people of Venezuela” (“Venezuela’s New,” 1959, p. 20).

The newly civilized nation, however, was beset with betrayals and conspiracies from both the right and left political extremes: “There seems to be no end to the plots against the Betancourt Government in Venezuela....It would be a tragedy for the cause of freedom and democracy in the hemisphere if any plot against the present regime in Venezuela should succeed” (“Venezuelan Plots,” 1960, p. 42). The *Times* set the stage, identifying the protagonists and antagonists, providing background information, building suspense and resolving conflicts in the name of order:

Like Shakespeare’s Octavius, President Romulo Betancourt is “bayed about with many enemies.” No Latin-American leader has had such a fierce, unrelenting, desperate struggle to stay in office. Uprisings, attempted assassinations, riots, revolutionary strikes, sabotage, guerrillas in the countryside, political opposition, economic difficulties – these are the day-to-day picture of Venezuela.... Romulo Betancourt has proved himself the most fearless and formidable opponent of the Communists in all of Latin America. (“Ferment,” 1962, p. 40, emphasis added)

Piracy on the high seas, the theft of priceless paintings, bank robberies, explosions, fires, riots, guerrilla warfare, deaths – these are the forerunners of the visit being paid to the United States by President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela. There is a paradox as well as a reason behind this dramatic entrance onto the American stage. (“Man,” 1963, p. 6, emphasis added)

A struggle that will provide another test of the survival powers of democracy in Latin America in the face of determined onslaughts by Castro-inspired, Communist terrorists is now in its climactic state in Venezuela. ("Terror," 1963, p. 22, emphasis added)

In the midst of danger, the victory for moderate democracy, order and stability remained safe, but the almost scripted tension between chaos and order continued to play out:

Venezuela will see her first transfer of power from one constitutionally elected President to another tomorrow....This will be a *great historic moment for all of Latin America....The economic situation is excellent. The confidence of foreign investors has been restored. The agrarian reform – one of the soundest in Latin America – is off to a good start. The unions have been favored and seem satisfied. The terrorists, backed by the Castro regime with arms, money, guerrilla training and propaganda, failed so miserably at the time of the elections that they were completely discredited. The courage of the Venezuelan people in turning out en masse to vote constitutionally was one of the most encouraging civic manifestations in the recent history of Latin America.* ("Venezuelan Succession," 1964, p. 36, emphasis added)

The *plot* which has just been *foiled* in Venezuela is proof that this *volcanic country* is still a goal of the world Communist movement... The present *stability and democracy* have been *warmly embraced* and they are *a source of great pride, but they are new arrivals* in Venezuela. The army has been unable to eradicate the *guerrillas in the western mountains* or the *terrorists in the cities....*While few in numbers, they are in a *fanatical, ruthless, bloody tradition* that has *disfigured the republic's history since its violent birth....*There is *no reason to fear revolution, but....*This is *a case for vigilance.* ("Moscow," 1965, p. 18, emphasis added)

The saga continued until the interest in and number of editorials on Venezuela dropped off after 1968.

Current Era. After a relatively quiet and orderly three decades from the U.S.'s point of view, the vulnerability of civilized democracy in Venezuela resurfaced with the election of Hugo Chávez as president in 1998. The dramatic metaphors of the Cold war era, however, were fewer and more restrained: "Six years ago Mr. Chávez led a military coup. It failed, but his messianic assault on the establishment captured the imaginations

of poor Venezuelans” (“Venezuela’s Electoral,” 1998, p. A26). The tension between chaos and order also remained: “The crisis in Venezuela is far from over, but the chances of resolving it democratically look considerably brighter than they did just a few weeks ago” (“Recall,” 2004, p. A28). Except in its descriptions of Chávez himself, as discussed below, the artistic flourishes and scene-setting of the previous era’s editorials were utilized less by the turn of the century.

Classification

Classifying tricontinental and indigenous peoples according to Western standards of political and technological development, colonial discourse judges success and failure of other nations and peoples by a single standard of progress that assumes an evolutionary nature of civilization. Westernized nations are more evolved than Others. Surveillance draws the boundary between civilization and barbarity, orders and defines the values at stake, and provides a panoramic view that places the Western eye in the position of authority and ownership. The trope of classification continues this discursive work by employing a linear and hierarchical standard with which to rate the progress of nations. The metaphor that types of government are fashions or styles supports this trope. Statesmen may act in a “particularly unworthy and contemptible fashion” (“We,” 1904, p. 8) if they do not abide by the standards of diplomatic civility. Outdated tactics, such as a military coup d’état, may be considered “old-fashioned in the hemisphere” (“Lull,” 1958, p. 28). This metaphor of international political styles classifies and compares all nations according to the most modernized standard.

Classification was one of the colonial discourse tropes most frequently reiterated by the *Times*’ editorial board for each era. In the discourse of the colonial era, the U.S. emerged as the global leader in politics, economics and morality, demanding that other

nations follow along in pursuit of modernity and civility. By the mid-century, the *Times* was applying its standards to internal conflicts in Venezuela to distinguish between civilized and uncivilized revolutions. At the end of the century, Venezuela had failed to modernize politically and economically according to the *Times'* standard, reinforcing the need for increased involvement by the U.S. All signs always point to increased intervention.

Colonial Era. As discussed under the category of surveillance, all nations were judged by the *Times* according to their willingness to cooperate with international law and to eschew “older and more brutal method of war” (“Venezuela and Alaska,” 1899, p. 6). Beyond this overarching standard of acceptable national “behavior,” other classifications were made comparing the Old World powers with each other and the U.S., the South American republics with the Euroamerican nations, and the South American republics with each other. An emphatically hierarchical order existed for the *Times*, ranging from the U.S. as the most politically, economically and socially evolved, to Great Britain, other European nations, cooperative Latin American republics, and finally uncooperative Latin Americans. This discursive work polices and regulates peoples and nations, enforcing values according to Western standards of progress.

In Venezuela’s case, the central theme consisted of proper and practical ways to collect and pay international debts: “Worse international manners than Germany has exhibited from the beginning of this wretched Venezuela business have rarely come under the observation of civilized men....this wanton renewal of hostilities at a time when peace negotiations, favored and aided by us, are in progress will wear in the eyes of the world the aspect of an affront to our Government” (“German,” 1903, p. 8). To ignore the opportunity for peace and stability that international arbitration provided was

“beyond human understanding in these modern days” (“Blockade,” 1902, p. 6). “It is going backward. It is a reversion to the earlier and the worse way” (“Hague,” 1902, p. 6). The admonishment of the old colonial and imperial powers of Europe placed the U.S. as the emerging leader of the civilized world. “The initiative of the United States compared with the paralysis of Europe” would fulfill the task of civilization, according to the *Times*, “to awaken the others from their lethargy and lead them forward in the way of justice and progress” (“Justice,” 1902, p. 8).

The combination of Western concepts of technology, evolution, morality and progress underlies the *Times*’ support of the emerging international legal system. Of the international court established in Paris after the Spanish-American War – the same court that ultimately determined the boundary dispute as well as the question of debt collection – the *Times* wrote: “The Hague machinery is, however, erected to enable Governments to take up just such causes of difference and to point those who are directly involved to the means of an adjustment which cannot humiliate either party and may save both. It is a fairly simple contrivance for the prevention of friction and of the unnecessary production of heat” (“Path,” 1903, p. 8). Metaphors of industrial innovation mix with the inevitability of natural evolution to produce a moral triumph: “It is not unreasonable, in the light of history, to cherish the hope that The Hague Court will finally emerge from all wars as the permanent Judge between the nations” (“Anglo,” 1904, p. 6). As the Old and New World nations settled into a new international structure of power, the *Times* viewed this change as a natural evolution of civilization.

Lagging behind what the *Times* considered older and more advanced Euroamerican nations were the brutish and unstable Latin American governments:

It is not what European nations *intend* to do that gives us anxiety, it is what they may be *hurried into* doing by moving events. *Even a little fire may spread*

disastrously. It would be much to our liking if these little fires were never kindled in the Western Hemisphere. We frankly admit that *they are kindled by the fault of Spanish-American Governments, not very stable at best, and not always regardful of obligation*. President Castro is *perhaps less sensitive* to the obligations of his Government *than the average South American statesman*. ("Venezuela," 1902, p. 8, emphasis added)

Within this classification, the Latin American nations were hierarchically ordered according to the civility of their international interactions:

The American Government now needs to give no thought to any difficulty likely to arise in connection with such nations as *Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and Peru*. All these States are *relatively thriving and correspondingly orderly and easy to deal with*. The change in all of them has been marked and highly creditable to them, as well as *advantageous to us and to the rest of the world*. It is in the direction of promoting prosperity *in the countries still exposed to unusual disturbance that we must look for permanent relief* ("Muddle," 1903, p. 8, emphasis added)

On the other hand, when a particular leader or nation remained stubbornly uncooperative and uncivil, the cause was assumed to be a lack of reason, a primordial stage of civilization:

President Castro's *organ* announces that his is indisposed "*to serve as the instrument of the United States in the latter's sinister designs against the weak republics of South America*." *It must be inferred* that President Castro *still* prefers to pay Venezuelan debts at the cannon's mouth, rather than as the result of *procedure* taking the place of litigation between nations. *It is as though a man should prefer to take the risk of adjudication by a bully's bludgeon rather than by legal process....Nothing but reason* is advanced in support of this proposition [for arbitration]. ("Lawmakers," 1906, p. 8, emphasis added)

Cold War Era. The process of classification, judgment, and admonishment continued during this era of Communist and indigenous resistance to United States' control of the Latin American region. Here, the *Times* began to apply the Western standard *internally* for Venezuela, identifying the emergence of civilized politics out of a chaotic and obscured history of barbarity. The direction of progress was always linear and forward. In its editorials, the *Times* took great pains to define and classify good and bad types of "revolutions." "Each of the four great Latin-American revolutions of the last

two and a half years – Argentina, Peru, Colombia and Venezuela – has been an extraordinary example of civic resistance against dictatorship...relics, anachronisms in a region of the world that has been shaking off its long heritage of militarism and autocracy” (“Venezuela’s Triumph,” 1958, p. 22).

In belated and hegemonic attempts to repent for U.S. support for previous dictatorial regimes, the *Times* ambivalently alternated between acknowledging and ignoring this history of imperial intervention in Venezuela. Most often, this situation was presented as the success of Latin Americans in defeating their own dark and barbaric proclivities and joining civilization on the path to democracy: “At last Venezuela is seeing her military men revolt for patriotic reasons and to win freedom and democracy for their country, not just to win the spoils of office. And at last the Venezuelan public is being aroused to the point of determined resistance against a brutal and predatory rule” (“Writing,” 1958, p. 22). “Betancourt is the type of statesman upon whom the future of a free, democratic, friendly Latin America depends...[T]he people of Venezuela, having won their liberty from military tyranny, will not let the clock be turned back” (“Venezuela Stands,” 1960, p. E8). “In this case there are only a few unhappy military officers and unpatriotic civilians who might want to turn the clock back” (“Venezuela’s New,” 1959, p. 20).

This metaphor, both mechanical and natural, of turning back a clock reinforced the linear essence of political and social progress assumed by the *Times* and applied to Venezuela to measure success and failure of the country in conducting itself properly according to “international” standards: “Vigorous economic expansion in eastern Venezuela sets an encouraging example for that country’s partners in the lagging Alliance for Progress. The rapid growth of heavy industry and the reclamation of

hundreds of thousands of acres of land along the Orinoco River represent the kind of progress the Alliance seeks but rarely achieves” (“Venezuela Expands,” 1968, p. 46). Conversely, in admonishment: “Whatever happens in Washington, we hope Venezuela is not serious about withdrawing from the O.A.S....That would be a disaster for the hemisphere and would not contribute to a solution for a problem that the affected governments seem gradually to be bringing under control” (“O.A.S.,” 1967, p. 214). The work of classification opened the way toward discursive intervention in the affairs of “sovereign” nations.

Current Era. By the turn of the century, the omnipresent work of classification continued to direct the journey of all nations toward a universal political and economic goal shaped in the image of the United States’ Western ideals. The critique of the universality of such a standard began to emerge in the discourse, but it did so hegemonically and was not quite resistant, as we see below.

The election of socialist Hugo Chávez as president of resource-rich Venezuela reawakened the *Times*’ interest in classifying and discursively policing events and processes in that country:

Mr. Chávez could become a populist despot, or could use his mandate to make long-needed changes while respecting the rule of law. Washington and Venezuela’s opposition should work with him to encourage a democratic approach. Venezuela’s two main parties, which have traded power for 40 years, have squandered the country’s wealth....

Washington should make clear it will help Mr. Chávez if he respects Venezuelans’ rights and the rule of law....

The solution is to deepen democracy, Venezuela’s most important achievement of the last 40 years. (“Venezuela’s Electoral,” 1998, p. A26, emphasis added)

When Chávez’s policies began to evidently counter the *Times*’ hopes for the region, they were characterized as “Jacobin decisions” that “seem destined to fail at fighting poverty” (“Emergence,” 1999, p. A12). This refusal to modernize according to U.S. standards, in

policymaking or political behavior, was described as self-destructive nonsense that only hurt the public that is supposed to be benefiting from free trade with the U.S. The professed concern for the Venezuelan “masses” echoed both previous eras and the trope of appropriation.

During the last decade, the *Times* has gone to great lengths to portray all developments in Venezuela as a regressive, backwards attempt to return to some bygone era of power-hungry dictators, bloated bureaucracies, anti-Yankee demagoguery, and even rapacious acts of war:

Mr. Chávez is a former army paratroop colonel who served a *jail term* after attempting a military coup in 1992. His *charisma*, identification with the poor and *revolutionary rhetoric* won him the presidency through the ballot box instead. Once in office he established an assembly that *sacked* hundreds of allegedly corrupt judges, *stripped* Congress of its powers and *rewrote* the Constitution. (“Consolidating,” 2000, p. A24, emphasis added)

According to the *Times*, Chávez was also prone to “slash the size and powers of Congress” (“Emergence,” 1999, p. A12). The truth of these claims is not contested by this study, but rather the manner of presentation that categorizes and reprimands in order to intervene on behalf of progress and civilized behavior: “Mr. Chávez needs to rebuild a meritocratic and professional bureaucracy in government and state-run companies, encourage entrepreneurship across the society and investigate allegations that his civilian support groups have been arming themselves” (“Venezuela’s Political,” 2002, p. A26).

The use of the metaphor of violence to represent non-violent political maneuvers classifies the actions as primitive. In the colonial era, the *Times* chastised the Old imperial powers for “presenting with cannon its claim against a debtor nation” (“No,” 1903, p. 6). In 2002 – in the days leading up to the coup against Chávez – the *Times* described Their approach to politics:

From the outset of his rule, Venezuela's president, Hugo Chávez, *targeted* the traditionally free media, viewing them as a threat to his *combative* brand of left-wing authoritarianism. He routinely *launches* into diatribes against the press, and his followers have *physically attacked* media outlets. ("Latin America's Muzzled," 2002, p. A22, emphasis added)

In comparison, the *Times* described Our approach in the same article:

In the interest of *deepening democracy's roots* throughout the Latin Americas, Washington should continue *encouraging* such regional efforts to *bolster* press freedoms. The Bush administration must also *stress* the importance of *protecting* free speech in its own dealings with Latin American governments, particularly ones like Colombia's that are *eager to gain* American support. ("Latin America's Muzzled," 2002, p. A22, emphasis added)

Condescension and admonishment of backwardness were, of course, not limited to Venezuela: "It is disturbing to see Mr. Chávez extend an economic lifeline to the Cuban dictatorship, particularly when so many Venezuelans remain mired in poverty. But concessionary oil sales are a familiar tradition in Latin America" ("Ambitions," 2000, p. A38). "The Andean nations have always been troubled, and lag behind the Southern Cone of South America in developing efficient state institutions" ("Containing," 2001, p. A14). The *Times* often took the liberty of holding up cooperative Latin American countries to admonish others: "Brazil's president is hardly a reckless firebrand. Wall Street applauds his prudent fiscal policies, which helped stave off a potential debt and currency crisis that could have affected all emerging markets. Moreover, President da Silva has acknowledged that it is important for Colombia to defeat its drug-trafficking guerrilla movements" ("Brazil's," 2004, p. A14).

Interestingly, the *Times* also co-opted the criticism of applying a single standard to all peoples of the world, yet still enforced that standard: "In Latin America, policy is always up for grabs. At the moment, leftist candidates are ascending. This comes after the privatization of the 1990's, the austerity of the 1980's, the discipline promised by military dictatorships in the 1970's, and the protectionism of the 1960's. But every idea

disappoints.” Even so, they argue, a report from the Inter-American Development Bank suggests that “life is improving. Not surprisingly, Chile is at the top of the list. More surprisingly, El Salvador is also highly ranked. Argentina and Venezuela are near the bottom” (“Beyond,” 2006, p. 24).

The editorial gave a brief nod to the idea that a single standard for all nations is problematic, stating that the report “challenges sweeping ideologies, and cautions that even programs found to work elsewhere often don’t cross borders well.” They noted that privatizations worked in Chile, but not in Argentina and Bolivia, nations that lack “strong regulatory institutions.” “Success depends,” they argued, “on how policies are adopted and carried out.” This is in essence a negation of their concern with applying a single standard:

The [report’s] researchers conclude that *policies created slowly, with popular consensus, work best, especially if countries have a professional civil service, a capable and well-staffed legislature, an independent judiciary, and longstanding political parties with strong ideological platforms...* these kinds of reforms may be *the real revolution, and the one that lasts.* (“Beyond,” 2006, p. 24, emphasis added)

By contrast, the *Times* adapted the metaphor that governance was a fashion to portray the revolutionary arguments of the emerging Latin American left as “the political popularity of these anti-Washington positions” and “part of a growing trend” (“Different,” 2005, p. A16). Equally belittling was the assertion that policy in Latin America was analogous to a “constant search for the hot new idea” (“Beyond,” 2006, p. A24).

Caricature Tropes

The characterizing tropes worked against any shadows of doubt that this civilizing mission was moral as well as absolutely inevitable. Whereas the first four tropes outline and delineated, these “caricature tropes” colored in the *Times’* colonialist

understanding of Latin America, Venezuela in particular here. Debasement of Venezuelan leaders and peoples vilified non-cooperative and non-Western Others. Negation supplemented by erasing Venezuelan history and presenting a national space void of political, economic or social structures. Affirmation filled that void with the highest order of values (and structures) associated with the U.S. Naturalization worked to make political crises seem natural results of uncivilized social behavior found in Venezuela. Each four supported, in different ways, the argument that the U.S. should be more involved in political and economic policy in Latin America.

Debasement

The trope of debasement in colonial discourse emphasizes the negative of Western values. An individual Other often stands in metonymically for the whole group, and the baseness reiterates the distinction between civilized and uncivilized cultures and justifies the need for intervention. In this case, I found that the *Times* applied rigorous character debasement of the Other in both the colonial and current eras but was much more carefully worded and diplomatic during the Cold war era.

The caricature of a childish, impudent, uncivilized or criminal Other pervaded the colonial era, as would be expected. This groundwork, however, and many of the colorful metaphors used, remained structurally intact to the present day, regardless of ambivalent attempts in the *Times'* discourse to separate innocent publics from corrupt leaders. Underneath a newfound politically correct language, the debasement lingered. The stark decrease in debasing assumptions during the mid-century occurred when a "friendly" government took power in Venezuela, unlike the other two periods. Even though debasement of non-Westerners continued to occur during this decade, the decrease may point to a more pragmatic employment of Othering by the *Times* that is a

different, albeit related, mode of discourse than essentialist Othering. The interplay between these two forms of Othering – practical and essentialist – and economic interests seems subtle but central to U.S. global hegemony throughout the three eras.

Colonial Era. From 1899 to 1908 the military dictator Cipriano Castro held the presidency in Venezuela. In contrast to other more “friendly” dictators, such as Mexico’s Díaz, Castro was opposed to the power over the region held by U.S. and European powers (Ewell, 1996). Of particular concern to the *Times* during his rule was Castro’s evasive and critical approach to paying Venezuela’s international debts. The *Times* periodically acknowledged Venezuela’s criticism of the fairness of the debts incurred, but ultimately insisted that the Venezuelan character was to blame for its predicament: “Quite too often the debt itself is not justly due, being, as in the Venezuelan case, largely made up of extortions easily practiced upon the debtor by reason either of his improvidence or his bad credit” (“End,” 1903, p. 6). “But it does not behoove a sovereign State to plead the baby act,” argued in an editorial that a) characterized Venezuela as a child among men in international matters, b) interchangeably admonished individuals and Venezuelan society as a whole, and c) distinguished between civilized cultures and unrefined, morally questionable ones. “That is the risk which Venezuela, or the immediate Venezuelan debtors, had to confront when it or they promised larger returns from a loan than an intelligent and honest business concern would have had to pay. They had to pay for the moral risk involved in their own bad character” (“Coercing,” 1902, p. 8). According to the *Times*, the Venezuelan borrower lacked the moral fiber necessary to delay personal gratification in the interest of pursuing the avowed public project, and this primitive behavior explained the extortionate debts.

The debasement of the character of Venezuelans in this regard separates them from the more sophisticated and civilized international position of the U.S.:

If the Venezuelans, or their Government, fondly imagined that the United States would stand by them in an effort to cheat their creditors, they were woefully deceived....

We do not..."stand for" fraudulent debtors any more than we stand for pirates and highwaymen....

More than one of the "little convulsive republics" is in the condition of a fraudulent debtor, and Haiti, at least, has come too near to the international status of a pirate or highwayman, or other enemy of the human race. ("Coercing," 1902, p. 8, emphasis added)

The pirate metaphor distinguishes people of law and order from a race of thieves and cheaters:

Mr. Manuel Silvera, who left Havana hurriedly for Venezuela last October with the treasure ship of J. M. Ceballos & Co., is reported to be flourishing as the wickedly traditionally flourish. President Castro and a number of Government officials and business men have made him their associate....

He lives and moves in the fashionable parts of Caracas, whose society is, of course, reluctant to think that a thief may not be admired. ("Editorial," 1907, p. 6, emphasis added)

The *Times* particularly concerned itself with the Venezuelan president and with "dealing with such an outlaw in the interests of civilization" ("Castro and the Powers," 1905, p. 8). Metaphorically referring to Castro as a bird of prey, the editors wrote: "Perched in his inaccessible eyrie at Caracas, he laughs at the shaking of the big stick from Washington and the threats of France to bombard the ports, the property of his preferred creditors. The role of Ishmael is already familiar and congenial to him. Some means of course must be found to reduce him to some semblance of decency" (ibid). The case for colonial or imperial intervention is often built on such character debasement (Said, 1978; Spurr, 1993), as we have seen most recently with Saddam Hussein and the intervention in Iraq. With an uncooperative head of state, the representations seemed to

be those of utter irrationality and whimsy that make it impossible to get along diplomatically:

President Castro is *not a serious man*. It is impossible to take seriously the head of a State who officially and personally, in public and in private, *conducts himself in so queer a way*. The restraints which the responsibilities of high office *usually impose* even upon exuberant natures Castro *gaily flouts*, and of public opinion, whether at home or abroad, he appears to take no account whatever. *His Government is as queer as himself*. It is exceedingly difficult for other nations to “get on” with a country in which the Chief Executive is in the habit of sending a note around to the highest court *to decide according to his will and command causes of international interest and importance...*

Manifestly any Power whose citizens maintain commercial relations with a country in which *law and justice are administered in such a manner* must expect to find itself *called upon sooner or later to redress international wrongs*. (“Venezuela and Santo Domingo,” 1905, p. 8, emphasis added)

This “chartered libertine” (“Castro and France,” 1906, p. 8), according to the *Times*, “is everything he ought not to be, and deserves all the punishment coming to Venezuela for his misdeeds” (“Venezuelan Porcupine,” 1906, p. 8). His base qualities were noted as consistently as they were distinguishable from civilized statesmanship and ultimately served as the justification for the U.S. government to intervene and protect itself: “He is exceedingly apt to be vain, foolhardy, and fond of display. The exhibition of these qualities by Castro tends to bring about the situation which would cause us uneasiness” (“British,” 1902, p. 8).

As personal as the *Times*’ assessment of Cipriano Castro was, the Venezuelans as a whole did not escape character debasement: “Castro is at present, and for some years has been the fount and origin of Venezuela’s troubles. About the only good thing said about that gentleman is that he is, possibly, the only Venezuelan living who can keep the Venezuelans in order” (“Holland,” 1908, p. 8). Whether through acts of war or arbitration, the Venezuelans were represented as learning lessons in civilized behavior:

No one will deny that the lesson in “ordinary courtesy” which Commodore Montgomerie of the British squadron wished to enforce upon the misbehaving

rabble of Puerto Caberlo [sic] was needed. They had gone aboard a British merchant ship, hauled down the British flag, and *otherwise misbehaved*.... They [the British] are dealing with a *passionate and unreasoning people. Acts of outrage and misbehavior they must expect.* ("Pacific," 1902, p. 8, emphasis added)

To Venezuela herself, *the lesson* has undoubtedly been, if not the most salutary, at least the most severe....

Venezuela learns not only that *it does not pay to repudiate debts*, but that that there is great danger in the improvident incurring of them. *The Venezuelans have been foolish and heedless, and their Government has been corrupt*....

They have got *a lesson in business and financial wisdom* which, let us hope, will be remembered ("End," 1903, p. 6, emphasis added)

In discussing the "lessons" learned by the other nations involved in the altercations, Great Britain and Germany, the *Times* carefully distinguished between the actions of the monarchical governments and the opinions and desires of the publics, faulting only the former.

Finally, the *Times* engaged in the sport of ridicule, which further disempowers the tricontinental challenge to the international structure of power:

He [Castro] was *dancing* under the trees in a very lively and *frolicsome* fashion....he struck a *Napoleonic* attitude, *waved his arms excitedly in the air* and declaimed: "Gen. Castro never apologizes"...

The crowd took up the cry, whirling around their partners in an excited fandango, and beating the empty bottles from which they had been drinking on the little iron tables which stood around. This is the way important diplomatic questions are decided in Venezuela ("Near," 1903, p. 8, emphasis added)

Another source of amusement for the *Times* derived from a habit of the Latin American elite in visiting or living in Paris: "It appears that he should equally exempt France...his general attitude denotes that the measure of his iniquities and of his bank account is nearly full, and that he is preparing to retire. History teaches us that bad South Americans, when they abdicate, go to Paris....He seems to be preparing for himself a dismal old age" ("France," 1905, p. 8). Accusing the president of embezzling international loans and foreign investments, the *Times* scoffed that if Cipriano Castro

were to be overthrown by rebellious uprisings in Venezuela, “then he will need his German and British money to cheer and console his declining days in Paris” (“Case,” 1902, p. 8). This form of debasement – ridiculing attempts to imitate the West – can be a powerful way to continually separate ourselves from the Other as they modernize to Western standards (Spurr, 1993).

Cold War Era. Debasement was most elaborate and pronounced during the Colonial era. The Cold war era saw more “friendly” relations between the U.S. and Venezuela, as the latter took a hard line against internal Communist movements as well as the Cuban revolution. Nevertheless, the tendency of the elite newspaper to regard Others with exasperated disdain occasionally shined through the predominately diplomatic speech. Addressing the tumultuous transition from dictatorship to democracy in the midst of Communist resistance in the region, the *Times* belittled the frequent uprisings: “It is getting so that an attempted coup d’état is hardly to be rated as news. Before dawn yesterday – the customary time – another group of unknown and dim-witted officers tried still another uprising, with the usual results” (“More,” 1961, p. 34). And again that same year: “Attempted revolts in Venezuela are coming with almost monotonous frequency....there are good reasons why such idiotic rebellions as yesterday’s cannot be dismissed too lightly” (“Flare-Up,” 1961, p. 32). Even in its hope for U.S.-style stability in the region, the *Times* seemed skeptical and condescending about the Venezuelans’ capabilities for civic life: “The people of Venezuela want an elected government – and they have one today. All they need is peace to work out their problems” (“Venezuela’s Fruitful,” 1959, p. 30). How this “peace” was defined or established was not an issue of debate for the editors.

Current Era. As seen in the Cold war era, the debasement of the Other becomes less flagrant throughout the century, to a large extent in response to resistance to imperial racist discourse in the U.S. and abroad. Debasing discourse on Venezuela in the *Times* from 1998 to 2007 predominately focused on the figure of President Chávez, vilifying him as the enemy of the hard-earned democracy and civility in Latin America: “Mr. Chávez, a former paratroop commander who staged an unsuccessful military coup in 1992, has so far shown little respect for the compromises necessary in a democracy, which Venezuela has had for 40 years” (“Emergence,” 1999, p. A12). Regardless of the economic and political devastation that resulted from the last four decades of democratic elections in Venezuela, the *Times* consistently portrayed Chávez as an anachronistic relic of the bygone era of immoral, power-hungry dictators in Latin America and an enemy of civilized constitutionalism:

The kind of *lucky breaks* President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela has been getting lately could *tempt* even a modest man – and *Mr. Chávez is no modest man – to dream grandiose dreams*. High oil prices, a terminally inept opposition and the Bush administration’s scandalous neglect of its Western Hemisphere neighbors have left the field wide open for Mr. Chávez *to bully people at home, buy friends abroad and annoy Washington at every turn....*

He has *marginalized Congress, undermined judicial independence and prosecuted political opponents*. By *tightening control* of the national oil company, he has been able to use high world oil prices to increase funds for popular social programs for the poor, making him *electorally unassailable*. That *dangerous concentration of power* will most likely worsen (“Hugo Chávez and His Helpers,” 2005, p. A14, emphasis added)

Occasionally, the *Times*’ palpable frustration with Chávez’s lengthy democratic tenure manifested itself as a disappointment in and condescension of Venezuelans, Latin Americans or emergent democracies in general: “In other new democracies in Eastern Europe and Latin America, voters at this point have tended to grow nostalgic for dictatorship or eager to find an outsider who promises revolution” (“Mexico’s,” 2006, p. A18). After six years of sympathizing with and supporting Chávez’s minority opposition

in Venezuela, the *Times* ultimately judged them by their failure to reinstate a civilized and refined rule in Venezuela:

The opposition, meanwhile, *needs to stop shouting foul*. It ran a *generally inept* referendum campaign, *failing to unite* around a single, credible challenger to Mr. Chávez and *failing to distance itself adequately from the oligarchic politics of the discredited past*. A *healthy* Venezuelan democracy needs not just a less divisive Mr. Chávez. It also needs a more *realistic and effective* opposition. (“Hugo Chávez Wins,” 2004, p. A22, emphasis added)

For the sixty percent majority that continued to support Chávez, “the opposition can blame only itself....That petulant idiocy [boycotting the recent Congressional elections] frustrated regional diplomats...and mystified and disenfranchised Venezuelan voters” (“Hugo Chávez and His Helpers,” 2005, p. A14). The voters in Venezuelan were predominately characterized by the *Times* as victims of demagoguery, susceptible to populist handouts and ignorant of their real interests:

The reason Mr. Chávez survived the challenge, despite his authoritarian impulses, is *not hard to figure out*...he has been able to use higher-than-expected oil revenues to advance social welfare. Some of his programs have been *poorly designed and shamelessly used* to build and mobilize political support. All the same, they are understandably appreciated by the millions of Venezuelans who have felt like the *neglected stepchildren* of the country’s oil boom. (“Hugo Chávez Wins,” 2004, p. A22, emphasis added)

The *Times* also continued to ridicule the Other’s attempts to imitate the Western ways of global statesmanship and civic life. Of a pan-American conference that proved disappointing for the *Times* in its failure to promote U.S.-style free trade policies, the newspaper flippantly characterized even the general theme of the international summit as naïve and inefficient: “‘Creating Jobs to Fight Poverty and Strengthen Democratic Governance’ is the mouthful that’s the theme of this meeting” (“Free,” 2005, p. A16). Moreover, the trope of Paris-frequenting dictators continued to distinguish sophisticated global leaders from the imitations: “Rarely have developing countries used oil money to improve the lives of the majority of citizens or bring steady economic growth. More

often, oil revenues have caused crippling economic distortions and been spent on showy projects, weapons and Paris shopping trips for government officials” (“Petro-Curse,” 2000, p. A18). President Chávez was characterized in the same ridiculous manner as Cipriano Castro of a century before, his criticisms of U.S. foreign policy characterized as a “Yanqui-baiting game” (“Venezuela Inc.’s,” 2007, p. A22):

A month earlier, at the Summit of the Americas in Argentina, Mr. Chávez *cavorted before crowds* of anti-Washington protestors and networked with his fellow Latin American presidents. He is hoping that either Argentina or Brazil will sell him a *nuclear reactor*, a step that would be a very bad idea considering Venezuela’s *burgeoning friendship with Iran* and the *excessive indulgence* Caracas has shown toward *Iranian nuclear ambitions*. (“Hugo Chávez and His Helpers,” 2005, p. A14, emphasis added)

This last example points to the ultimate work of the discursive trope of debasement: intervention. The *Times*’ consistent assessment of U.S. policy toward Latin America was that the Bush administration was not involved enough. This argument for intervention appeared cloaked in the humanitarian garb of saving the barbarians from themselves. Washington, they argued, “needs to compete more deftly and actively with Mr. Chávez for regional influence, and look for ways to work with the hemisphere’s other democracies to revive the multiparty competitive democracy that has now just about ceased to exist in Venezuela” (ibid).

Negation

Colonial discourse often represents the Other as an empty void that awaits to be filled with Western values of reason, order, development and progress. Spurr has argued that a modernist perspective differs from the opportunism found in earlier discourse in that the tone changes to one of modern angst over a tricontinental wasteland. In the *Times*’ characterization of Venezuela, a lack of law, order and development in the colonial era shifted into an erasure of politico-economic structure in the mid-century

preparation for Venezuela's admission into the civilized world. It then shifted again to characterize a bloated, corrupt and *soiled* wasteland during the Chávez presidency.

Colonial Era. In this case of the *Times* discourse on Venezuela, a modern angst seemed to already be present by the late nineteenth century. Because Castro was not a trustworthy and respectable leader, such as Mexico's Díaz, argued the *Times*, the Venezuelans would suffer from the lack of development: "A new enterprise...would be foredoomed from the start. Nobody would put any money in it, except as he might venture money on the turning of a card or of a wheel. The nation which allows itself to be represented by a Castro pays for that privilege, as Venezuelans will pay until she concludes that the privilege is not worth what it costs" ("Castro and France," 1906, p. 8). The gambling metaphor underscores a sense of loss and emptiness that characterized Castro's Venezuela according to the *Times*. This emptiness was a result of a perceived lack of law and order: "He would be a wise man indeed who could tell what the laws of Venezuela, as interpreted by its President, might at any given moment turn out to be, or what, for that matter, the lawmaking power might prove to be" ("President," 1905, p. 6).

The answer, for the *Times*, to Venezuela's non-existent understanding of international diplomacy and financial obligations consisted of filling that empty space with U.S. investments: "We have ways of maintaining the inviolability of the Monroe doctrine that are more direct, straightforward, and less embarrassing than an entanglement with irresponsible South American Governments....The sending there of American money and American men to develop its resources and increase its wealth would naturally augment its ability to pay its debts" ("Coming," 1902, p. 8).

Cold War Era. During the first decade of democratic elections in Venezuela, the *Times* represented the entire history of the country as a dark ages that left Venezuela with no political, social or economic structure:

In all her history of the past century and a half Venezuela has been under civilian rule for only three years....

For ten years the nation suffered under one of the most *corrupt and brutal dictatorships* in Latin-American history. The corruption has led to an *economic and financial crisis* especially *shameful to a country making the huge income* that accrued to Venezuela from the oil industry. The brutality has led among other things to such *hatred and bitterness...that the populace virtually goes mad*. ("Venezuela is Saved," 1958, p. 34, emphasis added)

The negative space caused by Venezuela's previous rulers was extensive: "The Pérez Jiménez regime ruined one of the richest nations of the hemisphere in the sense that it left an enormous debt and did so little productive capital expenditure, so little social reform and so little in fields like education" ("Venezuela's Fruitful," 1959, p. 30).

It was also consistently reinforced:

Venezuela was almost *uninterruptedly under military rulers for nearly a century and a half....*

The economy was left in bankruptcy by the dictator, Pérez Jiménez. The American petroleum industry, which is so vital to Venezuela's economy, is not helping the Betancourt regime. There is inflation, unemployment, a huge budgetary deficit, an unfavorable balance of trade....

The *United States*, let it be noted, is *doing its best to help* the Betancourt regime, which *lurches perilously ahead despite handicaps and uprisings* such as yesterday's. ("Flare-Up, 1961, p. 32, emphasis added)

The occasional reference to the role of U.S. companies in the region took on this tone of admonishing them for their *indifference* or *lack* of involvement, placing the blame for economic "failure" squarely on the ignorance or corruption of the Venezuelans.

As a result, the *Times* urged increased U.S. intervention in order to bring reason and order to the region: "He [Betancourt] is under attack from the Left and the Right. The economy of his country is in bad shape because of the extravagances and heavy indebtedness of the dictator General Pérez Jiménez....The United States must, and surely

will, help all it can" ("More," 1961, p. 34). President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress regional investment plan provided the structure needed to fill the void:

On the *positive side*, Mr. Kennedy has an *intangible but important asset*. What is now called his "image" is a good one in Latin America. He is identified with a *genuine desire to help the common man, to bring about the social justice for which Latin Americans are clamoring*, and to identify the United States generally with the *struggle to meet the popular and democratic challenges* of our times...

The *Alliance for Progress* plan that President Kennedy is pushing is concentrated on *social reforms* and especially *housing, education and land reform*. ("President," 1961, p. 42, emphasis added)

Leaders of South America, by contrast, "are beset by critical divisions in their parties or coalitions which could damage the cause of democracy far beyond the borders of Chile, Venezuela and Peru" ("Latin," 1967, p. 46).

Current Era. The *Times'* once-unwavering support of Venezuela's "40 years of democracy" turned somewhat nihilistic as the U.S.'s desires for the region remained unfulfilled and poor and rural Latin Americans heightened their resistance to the superpower. The editors assessed the wasteland, criticizing "corruption and economic mismanagement that have brought a once-prosperous country to misery" ("Consolidating," 2000, p. A24). The weakness of the Venezuelans explained their laziness and capitulation to the corrosive effects of oil:

In the last decade, when other Latin American countries were carrying out needed economic reforms, Venezuela's oil cushion *sapped the political will* for needed austerity programs. Many Venezuelans believe that oil has also undercut the importance of personal initiative by offering *wealth without work....*

But *even leaders aware of the pitfalls of oil will not be able to avoid them if corruption and mismanagement are endemic*. ("Petro-Curse," 2000, p. A18, emphasis added)

Often negation applied to the region as a whole: "The lack of rule of law has led to autocratic leadership in Venezuela, Bolivia and...Peru as well" ("Containing," 2001, p. A14). "Elsewhere, the region is disillusioned with the last decade's free-market reforms.

Too often twisted into a corrosive form of crony capitalism, the ‘Washington consensus’ did little to improve living standards or alleviate poverty. The economic disillusionment has devalued the appeal of democracy as a form of governance and empowered once-marginalized political forces” (“Turmoil,” 2003, p. A 24). The *Times* consistently described a lack of political structure and the defeat of democracy in the region: “Such demands seek to short-circuit the democratic process. Usually occurring in the most unfortunate countries, they degrade institutions, polarize politics and impede the continuity necessary for growth....While many protesters want to destroy everything and start from zero, Latin America needs more continuity, not less” (“Latin America’s Half-Term,” 2004, p. A26).

Of the near-total economic and social failure described by the *Times*, the editors conceded some responsibility of U.S. policy: “One explanation is that nearly two decades of Washington-recommended economic and trade policies have not done much for millions of urban and rural poor” (“Different,” 2005, p. A16). The *Times*, however, argued that the *absence* of U.S. intervention was to blame for the apparent regression of the “left-behind and angry poor,” who were voting for demagogic “denunciations of Yanqui imperialism” (ibid). In the final analysis, the void that is – and always has been – Venezuelan politics can only be filled by the U.S.: “If your taste runs to three-hour speeches, chiseling away at democracy and a world-class personality cult, Mr. Chávez is your man. But if the goal is to lift millions of people out of grinding poverty, only a major effort by the United States – the hemisphere’s biggest economy and strongest democracy – can make a serious difference” (“Thanks,” 2007, p. A20).

Affirmation

The employment of the trope of negation in colonial discourse is complemented by an emphasis on the positive side of Western values. Whereas the Other represents nothingness, Western society provides the values of civilization, humanity, science and progress that alone can modernize the rest of the world. This trope characterizes the U.S.'s benevolent interventions and moral duty to raise the rest of the world from its debased and empty existence. In each of the time periods I analyzed, the *Times*' editorials showed no question, no shadow of a doubt, that the United States constituted the single, universal guiding light toward civilized society for Venezuela and the world. Consistently reproducing and reinforcing the self-affirmation of Western values of progress, the *Times* lays claim to the White Man's Burden in the colonial era, transposed that civilizing mission onto Latin American leaders in the Cold war era, and continued in the current era to position the values of democracy, liberty and stability as the sensible and professional Western remedies to Venezuela's negative.

Colonial Era. Taking the moral high ground in a stand against the aggressive nature of European imperial powers, the *Times* positioned the U.S. as a guiding light for the evolution of civilization from war and barbarism to rules, regulation and arbitration:

Enough has been given to show that there has been for many years *much blind following, by diplomatic officers and careless historians, of misleading assertions* concerning the Venezuela-Guiana boundary; and the *turn that was given to the controversy by the United States* becomes most *satisfactory* to contemplate in the light of this *report*, which *will doubtless be a new light* to the arbitral tribunal that is to settle the boundary for Great Britain and Venezuela. ("Venezuela Report," 1897, p. 6, emphasis added)

Assessing the U.S.'s role in securing negotiations, the *Times* argued that "already it is an established and immutable truth of history that" then-President Grover Cleveland "exhibited the qualities that constitute the highest statesmanship and performed a duty

that for his country and for human civilization was of incalculable value.” The actions of the U.S. president, argued the *Times*, “led promptly to peaceful and honorable settlement...Venezuela was protected...the Monroe Doctrine was affirmed...Great Britain remains our best friend....Mr. Cleveland out of that series of grave events brought peace with honor” (“New,” 1901, p. 6). The intervention of the U.S., however necessary to the progress of civilization, was commonly portrayed as a reluctant duty – the White Man’s Burden: “Germany and Great Britain seem disposed to force upon Mr. Roosevelt the task of arbitrating their differences with Venezuela. If their urgency overcomes his reluctance he will certainly have the right to impose certain responsible conditions” (“Mr. Roosevelt,” 1902, p. 8). The actions taken by the United States were represented as nothing short of messianic:

It was, indeed, *a Christmas gift to the whole wide world*, a gift to mankind at large, since it manifestly *saved* The Hague Court from the *impending peril* of being passed by and forgotten....
By the action of our Government it is now in a way to be *restored* to general esteem and its *rightful place*....If *we have saved* the tribunal from falling into disuse *all civilized nations will share the benefit of our act*. (“Justice,” 1902, p. 8, emphasis added)

The implications of such heroic feats of the U.S. for the benefit of all mankind justified intervention: “The Republic of Venezuela is under obligations to us for bringing about the arbitration which peacefully settled her boundary dispute with Great Britain. We can justly make some draft upon her sense of gratitude now by indicating to her President that we should be greatly pleased to see him come to some prompt understanding with the republic’s creditors” (“British,” 1902, p. 8). The interventions and assumptions of authority work to restructure Venezuela’s society and economy to the U.S.’s benefit, albeit under the guises of humanitarianism and neutrality that demand “merit systems,” “stability,” “peace,” “intelligence and experience,” and

“practical and sensible plans.” Of the demand that then-President Castro submit to legal arbitration concerning the payment of U.S. citizens’ loans and investments in Venezuela, the *Times* assumed for the U.S. government and public a neutral, practical and impartial stance: “This is really the strong point in the case of the United States. Our Government has unquestionably shown great care and patience in every phase of negotiations. There has not been the slightest manifestation of a domineering spirit or failure to treat the Venezuelan Government with respect and with friendliness” (“Venezuela Botheration,” 1908, p. 6). This statement may easily be considered blatantly false simply within the *Times*’ own editorials. The discursive work it does, however, is to position the U.S. as the world’s champion of reason and fairness: “But in any case our people must bear in mind, and the world must be called upon to witness, that the utmost that our Government requires of Venezuela is that strong prima facie claims shall be submitted to fair and impartial arbitration” (ibid).

The historical results of the arbitration speak against this professed impartiality. The boundary issue, still in dispute today, had been decided by the Hague against Venezuela via collusion between Great Britain and a Russian judge, trading judgments as political favors (Ewell, 1996). Venezuela’s international debt was eventually paid down in the 1930s via oil concessions to U.S. companies (Coronil, 1996). In contrast to its own continuous affirmative rhetoric, such as was propounded by the *Times*, the U.S. can never really be the impartial or neutral mediator it so often claims for itself. These self-affirming claims to reasonable, impartial international politics are the discursive, ideological work that ultimately results in *real* consequences – urgent, material, and often brutally violent.

Cold War Era. During this time period, the U.S. was experiencing sustained criticism of its support of dictators by Latin American leaders, such as the Venezuelan democrat Betancourt. In this era, the trope of affirmation seemed to shed its direct assumption of an imperial civilizing mission and was instead employed in a combination of championing the role and values of the U.S. and transposing those values onto particular cooperative Latin Americans:

It was signed by a long list of distinguished statesmen, scholars, political leaders and editors in many of the Latin-American countries and was circulated throughout the hemisphere in the free press. It is a firm and dignified statement of the democratic principles that should guide Latin-American nations and an expression of faith in the fitness and readiness of the Latin countries for democracy. ("Democracy at Work," 1958, p. 26, emphasis added)

The hegemonic shift in discourse, however, was a thin veil for the *Times'* propensity for self-affirmation. Quoting U.S. President Eisenhower (a staunch supporter of the Pérez Jiménez dictatorial regime) and, in a way taking credit for the revolt of Venezuelans against their last dictator, the *Times* bombastically declared:

"The United States believes firmly in the democratic elective process and the choice by the people through free and fair elections of democratic governments responsive to them. Authoritarianism and autocracy of whatever form are incompatible with the ideals of our great leaders of the past. Free institutions, respect for individual rights and the inherent dignity of man are the heritage of our Western civilization." The dictators of Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Paraguay might wisely take note. ("Democracy in Venezuela," 1958, p. 28, emphasis added)

Of Senator Nelson Rockefeller's business trip to South America, the *Times* relayed his "intelligent helpfulness" and portrayed Latin Americans as eagerly accepting of the U.S.'s modernization plans:

He had demonstrated how strains of cattle can be improved, how more and better rice and wheat can be grown, and generally how South Americans can be encouraged to help themselves. That anyone so knowledgeable about Latin America and so friendly to its people should have been elected to one of the highest political positions in the United States naturally interested and pleased everyone south of the Rio Grande. ("Yankee," 1958, p. 28, emphasis added)

This assessment of the oilman's business in South America foreshadowed the *Times*' approval and promotion of Kennedy's Alliance for Progress plan:

If it succeeds, it will *transform the social, economic and political structures of all the Latin-American nations*. In its aims...this is an attempt to make a veritable *social revolution* in Latin America. In its simplest terms, the Alliance for Progress is an effort to bring about *social and economic reforms by democratic, evolutionary methods*. The emphasis is on land reform, housing, education and welfare, all of which would accompany *economic development*. ("Latin-American," 1961, p. E8, emphasis added)

This optimistic hope for progress in Venezuela fills that nation's void, its non-history, with aspirations for a complete structural overhaul in the image of Western civilization. Nothing short of a messianic guiding light.

Current Era. Faced with an increasingly resistant and indignant Latin America at the turn of the century, the *Times* remained firmly convinced that a U.S.-led, free-trading, and civic global society was the only answer to the void that continued to exist in the Latin American character:

Mr. Chávez's *vague "Bolivarian" ideology* – inspired by the achievement of Venezuela's national liberator, Simon Bolivar, in *briefly uniting* present-day Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador – *understandably worries neighboring governments*. But *Washington can reinforce the political stability of Venezuela's troubled Andean neighbors by helping them strengthen their judicial systems, combat official corruption and develop new export industries*. ("Ambitions," 2000, p. A38, emphasis added)

Belittling and selling short Bolívar's achievement in winning the independence of the Andean region from Spanish colonial rule almost two centuries earlier, the *Times* instead positioned the U.S. as the guiding light toward liberation, stability and peace. The U.S., however, was not guaranteed success in civilizing the hemisphere, due to the struggle against the region's more barbaric tendencies: "If he [George W. Bush] is to succeed as a free-trade proponent, which we hope he does, he must define more clearly how he proposes to achieve an agreement that will promote trade while ensuring that

nations cannot engage in a 'race to the bottom' by diluting their environmental regulations and labor laws to seek unfair trade advantages and attract investment" ("Selling," 2001, p. A18).

Elsewhere, the *Times* positioned the U.S. as the impartial overseer or protector of democracy in Venezuela, regardless of the U.S.'s well-documented history of vested interventions that speaks to the opposite:

The best hope for a peaceful, democratic outcome to Venezuela's political crisis may now rest in the mediation efforts of Jimmy Carter. During his presidency Mr. Carter was a firm champion of democracy throughout Latin America, standing up to the military tyrannies that then predominated in the region.... The United States and five other nations trying to resolve the standoff hold their first meeting in Washington today. Venezuelans of all persuasions should rally behind the Carter proposals. ("Preserving," 2003, p. A22, emphasis added)

The metaphor that the U.S. is a nurturing paternal figure emerged strongly in this era. In the Colonial era, the *Times* eschewed the role of the U.S. as the protectorate of the uncivilized region in favor of pragmatic, self-interested intervention when necessary. In 2000, the editors began to argue that Washington should be paying more attention to Latin America, that we should be encouraging without being overbearing, and that it was our *neglect* of the region that had fostered the manifested and growing rebellion. The therapeutic metaphor of maternal/paternal neglect obscured the extensive power the U.S. wields over Latin American economies, presenting them instead as all-too-independent entities.

Naturalization

Naturalizing the suffering and chaos that seem so representative of the three continents in international reporting strips the events of their socially constructed aspects. Rather than an effect of relationships of power and political decisions, equating social unrest with natural processes makes it appear cyclical, inevitable, and immutable.

This trope is particularly metaphorical, as it points to the analogies between the social and natural world in order to naturalize social relationships of power. In this analysis, I found that the *Times* characterized a primitive state of nature in Venezuela at the turn of the nineteenth century, a nation on the brink of emerging from tropical jungle life in the mid-century, and by the end of the twentieth, a relapse of disease and contamination – a political, social and economic structure steeped and suffocating in oil.

Colonial Era. The naturalness and inevitability of social unrest in Venezuela during this time period was best captured by the *Times*' editorial headlines: "The Muddle in Venezuela" (1903, p. 8), "The Venezuelan 'Mess'" (1903, p. 8), "End of the Venezuelan Mess" (1903, p. 6), "Venezuela Again" (1904, p. 6), "The Venezuelan Porcupine" (1906, p. 8). The *Times*' exasperation with the instability in the region that impeded commercial trade at the Venezuelan ports frequently focused on the primitive tendencies of Latin Americans to irrationally favor their Castro-dictators and violent revolutions:

The theatrical resignation of Mr. Castro as President of Venezuela is *only an added instance of the extreme difficulty of dealing with some of the South American Republics*. So far as it can now be interpreted it does not imply any radical change in the political situation, and *probably his successor, his brother or another, will wield much the same power in much the same way*. ("Muddle," 1903, p. 8, emphasis added)

The *Times* considered Cipriano Castro, and often by extension the political events in Venezuela, in animalistic or primitive terms. To the *Times*, Castro

was a *rascal of the most reckless sort and behaved himself after his kind... surrounded by a pack of foreign adventurers with whom his dealings were marked by alternations of corruption and violence*, to whom he sold concessions of supposedly great value and from whom, when they *incurred his animosity or excited his greed*, he proceeded to take away the concessions and the profits, thereof. ("Venezuela," 1908, p. 6, emphasis added)

The role of the U.S., according to the *Times*, was partially to instruct Latin Americans in how best to resist their primitive urges and join civilization. Revolution

may be “in blossom,” or “speedily ripen to maturity,” in several South American nations, but Puerto Rico, under the supervision of the United States, could prove the U.S.’s ability to control these forces of nature:

We hope that ex-President Andrade’s confidence in the determination and ability of the United States to make *law and order* the *normal condition* of Puerto Rico, and *revolution and disorder* merely *horrors of a past and discarded misgovernment*, will be fully justified....

he may have the chance to discern that *Spanish-speaking communities can get along without revolution*, and that revolution may be prevented without the strong rule of dictators. (“Andrade’s,” 1899, p. 6, emphasis added)

Cold War Era. Likewise, the previously U.S.-supported dictatorship of Pérez Jiménez was repetitively characterized by the *Times* as a “brutal and predatory” state of nature. During the revolt against Pérez Jiménez in 1958, the *Times* described a scene that resembles an uproar worthy of the tropical jungle where it took place: “President Pérez Jiménez of Venezuela still clings precariously to his dictatorial position....What we are seeing now is a lull between two storms....A palace revolution, a civil war, further uprisings, street riots, strikes, mass arrests – almost anything is possible now, except internal peace” (“Lull,” 1958, p. 28). During the exile of Pérez Jiménez, the *Times* periodically provided updates on his whereabouts, which they casually termed his “present roosting-place” (“Unwelcome,” 1958, p. 28). The metaphorical reference to the Latin American dictator as a bird of prey echoed the previous era.

The unrest in Venezuela, however, did not end with deposition of the dictator, and the revolution in Cuba raised fresh concerns over the “ferment” and “profound roots” of continued uprisings:

The Cuban revolution, *from its inception* three years ago, resembled the process of *dropping a stone in a lake*. There is *the splash* – and then *the ripples* that go on and on *until stopped by the solid shores*. The ripples, in this case, have not yet stopped. Simultaneously with the *hemispheric* meeting of foreign ministers in Punta del Este, Uruguay, there have been *bloody riots* throughout Venezuela at

the other end of the South American continent” (“Glance,” 1962, p. 20, emphasis added).

To the volcanic eruptions of revolution, the *Times* preferred a different inevitable and natural process – that of evolution:

The leader who became President, Romulo Betancourt, is a *democrat seeking the solution of Venezuela’s social and economic imbalance by evolutionary means....* The political structure was held together by President Betancourt’s *big, moderate, centrist* Acción Democrática party. Now that party has split: the *Right Wing watches apprehensively*; the *Left Wing riots*. *The sum total is trouble* (“Glance,” 1962, p. 20, emphasis added)

The unrest was commonly understood by the *Times* as a tumultuous period of recovery after a long illness: “These are naturally difficult days and months while that shaken country recovers from the harmful effects of ten years of a brutal and predatory military dictatorship” (“Democracy in Venezuela,” 1958, p. 28). “Countries that suffer the maltreatment of dictatorship for many years cannot recover quickly and easily” (“Venezuela is Saved,” 1958, p. 34). “A nation that shakes off a dictatorship is like a person recovering from a severe illness. Time, care and patience are needed before strength returns. A relapse must be guarded against” (“Venezuela’s New,” 1959, p. 20). As seen in the editorial’s conclusion, this metaphor encourages surveillance and intervention in case the “illness” is not completely eradicated. It also obscures the source of Venezuela’s unrest and uprisings as an abstract disease, rather than particular social conditions that could be changed.

Current Era. In 2002, the *Times* continued employing this metaphorical schema of illness, adapting it to emphasize the potential for contamination: “The Organization of American States has rightly identified insufficient press freedoms as a regional epidemic” (“Latin America’s Muzzled,” 2002, p. A22). The resurgence of resistance toward the end of the century prompted the *Times* to again describe a

spreading of a dangerous disease throughout Latin America: “The particulars of their individual stories vary, but in recent years all five Andean nations of South America have suffered crippling bouts of political violence and instability” (“Turmoil,” 2003, p. A24). “The anti-establishment mood has spread, leading to populist soldiers and a coca grower taking the presidencies of Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia. Now Peru may elect the most dangerous leader yet” (“Peru’s,” 2006, p. A24). The naturalization trope here reinforces the suspense and drama captured in the analysis of aestheticization, and the two tropes compliment each other to create a sense of fear and urgency that must be remedied:

In a bitterly divided Venezuela, opposition leaders are threatening a general strike as part of their campaign to force President Hugo Chávez out of office. Next door in Colombia, fighting between leftist guerrillas and the army has intensified. Argentina recently defaulted on a World Bank loan, jeopardizing access to urgently needed financing to *ameliorate widespread suffering*....Memories of brutal dictatorships may be too raw to imagine *an epidemic of coups* anytime soon, but authoritarian-minded governments may increasingly be tempted to capitalize on the widespread disenchantment to subvert the rule of law. (“Beleaguered,” 2002, p. A26, emphasis added)

“Washington has a strong stake in Venezuela’s recovery,” (“Hugo Chávez Departs,” 2002, p. A16), the *Times* argues, looking toward the administration for “economic prescriptions” (“Different,” 2005, p. A16) and “a healthy development” (“Thanks,” 2007, p. A20).

In addition to the disease metaphors, the *Times* also showed signs of the jungle metaphor of the earlier colonial era, as the editors discussed “thorny hemispheric matters, most notably the crisis in Venezuela” (“Backtracking,” 2003, p. A14). President Chávez himself “is an example of a president who is wildly unpopular with half his country, but fiercely defended by the other” (“Latin America’s Half-Term,” 2004, p. A26). In the world’s dark jungles, the battle for civilization is hard won. At times, the *Times* entertained the despair that nature cannot be controlled:

It is a widely noted paradox that *striking oil can be disastrous for a poor country*. In Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, Venezuela and many other places, *oil and gas have brought corruption and strife*. Some of the reasons, such as *oil's distorting effects on exchange rates, trade balances and credit, are hard to combat...*

In Nigeria, the public *belief* that oil companies participate in corruption has helped turn the oil-producing Niger Delta region into a *battleground* where companies face *sabotage, kidnappings and shutdowns*. ("Making," 2003, p. A8, emphasis added)

The natural tendency of *oil* to corrupt uncivilized peoples here induces the naïve, violent, and misdirected (pagan-like?) behavior of indigenous publics. The *Times* hoped, however, that progressive initiatives of the global oil companies and non-governmental organizations to demand that "corrupt" governments disclose their revenues publicly would "give companies a tool to resist paying huge bribes and to breach confidentiality agreements they have signed with corrupt governments. It would also help ensure that oil and gas revenues are used to create more prosperous and stable societies" (ibid). Thanks to the benevolent intentions of the world's oil companies, the *Times* intimated, the world had a new "tool" with which to civilize human nature and defeat barbarity.

Other Tropes

Idealization, Insubstantialization, and Eroticization.

This analysis did not uncover many examples of these three tropes. One plausible explanation may be that the genre of editorials does not encourage them. More artistic and expressive, they may be employed more substantially in the types of feature-like articles that Spurr (1993) analyzed. One interesting find that may be explored further with a different sample is a hint of adaptation in the trope of eroticization.

The colonial-era editorial at times displayed the familiar understanding of the nation as a "she," which lent itself to metaphorical understandings of the difference between civilized and barbarous acts of war:

If the two European powers had actually and openly gone to war with Venezuela, with the *intent to punish her* for outrageous acts, *to seize her territory*, or *to repel her invading forces*, everybody would understand, of course, that blood would have to be spilled. But we have the assurance of those powers that they intend nothing of that kind....

The warships of Great Britain and Germany have gone to the coast of Venezuela, not to *ravage and destroy*, not to inflict punishment, but to collect moneys due of which payment has been refused. ("Arbitration," 1902, p. 8, emphasis added)

By the end of the twentieth century, these references to gendered violence are no longer socially or politically acceptable. Homoeroticized analogies, by contrast, were employed as a new form of sexual deviancy in order to demonize political undesirables. The *Times* criticized "Mr. Chávez's courtship of...the FARC," "the spectacle of Mr. Castro and Mr. Chávez happily bantering in Caracas," how Chávez "embraced Saddam Hussein," "received Fidel Castro," "reached out to Marxist rebels" ("Ambitions," 2000, p. A38), and "courted Fidel Castro and Saddam Hussein" ("Hugo Chávez Departs," 2002, p. A16). Such descriptions of an orgy of vilified national leaders appeared in the *Times'* approval of the violent coup d'état that occurred in Venezuela the day before. This powerful use of sexualized language certainly deserves further scrutiny with a different sample.

Resistance

Spurr (1993) has argued that resistance to colonial discourse takes place in journalism when: a) ideological language is questioned from a non-Western point of view; b) the conditions of observation are questioned; c) non-objectivity is acknowledged and discussed; and d) other voices and perspectives are present. The first three possibilities are those of self-reflection on the part of the Western journalist, but this is different from criticizing one or another U.S. policy. When resisting colonial discourse, the "commanding view," or the assumed authority to define and categorize, is itself analyzed. The fourth possibility is the inclusion of the Other's voice. This last potential

for resistance is not static, and it is often difficult to ascertain the distinctions between acknowledging the Other's voice as a position of authority and co-opting that voice to preserve the structures of power. The former provides the space for change; the latter is often manifested as pretensions to self-criticism or a "balanced" analysis. Regardless of a potential for editorials to reach beyond the traditional structures of reporting to assess and analyze international relationships and interactions, the *Times*, in this case, displayed little to no willingness to resist colonialist understandings of the global order.

A few examples may point the way toward a better understanding of what is required to challenge our colonialist ideologies that underlie Our most trusted mainstream source of international news. In 1961, an editorial printed the only quote of a non-Washington-based voice found in this sample. Then-President Rómulo Betancourt warned of the lessons that must follow from President Kennedy's recent visit to Latin America: "One was that Mr. Kennedy, at least for Venezuela, was 'rectifying a long period of ignorance and lack of comprehension of the problems of Latin America and of faith placed in dictatorships.' The other was that 'unilateral action or individual intervention in dealing with any of these problems would mean the breakdown of the regional system'" ("At Journey's," 1961, p. 32). This seems to be the only moment in the *Times'* editorializing on Venezuela that the newspaper acknowledged the possibility that the U.S. may be ignorant of, or lack comprehension of, the needs, desires, or "problems" of Latin Americans. Despite this acknowledgement, in the voice of the respected Betancourt, the newspaper consistently assumed that only the U.S. has evolved the political, social and economic knowledges necessary to lead Latin America from its dark ages into civilization. Unfortunately, the argument did not come without a response from the editors that reinstated the global authority of the U.S.: "There was nothing

more important said on the whole trip than President Kennedy's challenge to 'the leaders of Latin America, the industrialists and the landowners...to admit past mistakes and accept new responsibilities.'" (ibid).

In more recent editorials, the *Times* struggled to find a way to acknowledge the widespread resistance to the U.S.'s economic goals for Latin America without forfeiting its commanding view. At times, this resulted in a mixed analysis of where the responsibility lay for the extensive poverty and inequality in the region:

A decade of retrenching in the United States on trade, combined with economic and currency messes in several Latin American countries, particularly Argentina, have left governments with little appetite for opening markets. *Many governments south of the border blame the model of free trade, open markets, privatization and fiscal austerity pushed by the United States for the vast increase in social inequality in the region during the past decade.* ("Free," 2005, p. A16, emphasis added)

Most often this analysis found its way into supporting *increased* involvement in Latin American affairs, but the Other's voice was at least offered in this example.

The only explicit adoption of an external point of view occurred in the *Times*' admonishment of Pat Robertson's televised call to assassinate Hugo Chávez and of the Bush administration's tepid response toward Robertson. The editors asked their readers to assume a non-U.S. perspective of the situation: "Imagine, for comparison purposes, what the White House would say if a Syrian mullah had gone on Al Jazeera and called for the assassination of the president of the United States" ("Judgment," 2005, p. A22). The editorial concluded, however, by sympathizing with the political difficulties for President Bush in reprimanding a leader of his electoral base: "That obviously makes things awkward for the president. But common decency, not to mention a rational sense of the national interest, demands condemnation of his [Robertson's] remarks," even though Chávez had "declared his undying enmity for the Bush team" (ibid). This conclusion

neutralized the perspective of Venezuelans on the issue, continued to demonize Chávez, and defined its demands for an official reprimand in terms of “common decency” and “national interest.” The end result was to position Washington as the most decent and unfairly implicated player in this sordid business.

CONCLUSIONS

The Western arrogance of feeling that it has everything to teach others and nothing to learn from them is not just.

Martin Luther King, Jr.

There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism.

Walter Benjamin

By relying on understandings of world politics that were generated to legitimize the colonial system, *The New York Times* reinforces a 500-year-old oppressive distinction between the European modern Self and the primitive barbaric Other. This distinction lies at the base of the ideology of modernization, of which journalism seems to be one of the most prominent and ubiquitous popularizers. Analyzing the different manifestations of colonial discourse according to Spurr's (1993) model has illuminated a continuity of thought in the *Times* from the end of high colonialism at the turn of the nineteenth century to the imposition of neocolonialism at the turn of the twentieth. Continuity is important for this type of analysis because it highlights the genealogy of our assumptions about people and the world. We may take our assumptions for granted, but the identification of an undesirable lineage can startle us into questioning "natural" definitions and boundaries.

Given the evidence above, I argue that the basis for our knowledge and understanding of international relations and policy regarding Venezuela is the colonialist-imperialist distinction between Self and Other that has historically provided

the ideological support for exploitation. Knowledge-producing institutions such as *The New York Times* are implicated as the reproducers and reinforcers of this colonial knowledge. More than jingoistic propaganda (Rodríguez, 1998), the editorializing described above defines, inscribes, represents *identities* in colonizing gestures to provide justification for U.S. intervention. If, as Derrida has argued, the process of subordination begins in the discursive act of naming, classifying, and defining boundaries, then journalism bears a significant responsibility as the modern popularizer of the categories of subordination. In the case of Venezuela in the *Times*, I have here analyzed the three time periods in which a sustained discursive effort to define, stage and delimit the international roles of Venezuela and the U.S. was undertaken by the editors of the newspaper.

Establishing the Legal Structures and Standards

Editorials on Venezuela in *The New York Times* from 1897 to 1908 provide insight into the discursive work of an emerging global superpower and how that emergence was predicated on subordinating and subsuming the Other. This has strong implications for the concept of a Self-made U.S., or Western, civilization that maintains its ideological dominance today. This discursive work and its implications must be acknowledged, understood and criticized so that we can begin to unravel and imagine the hybridity and mutual evolution that has taken place globally since the onset of colonialism.

In the case of the *Times* on Venezuela, the ultimate work done during this era was to establish a clear distinction between the civility of an international legal system and the barbarity of war and violence. This boundary defined law as nonviolence and violence as non-law. Legal arbitration was classified and defined as an impartial and

peaceful method by polarizing acts of violence and acts of law. The most significant ideological work done during this era seems to establish this – that law and violence are two distinct categories, related in an either/or opposition. This understanding hides the violence of civilization and law by defining that problem as Other. In other words, the method of violence is excluded from “the test of reason and justice,” as a primitive, pre-modern natural tendency, presenting an artificial choice between fair and impartial civil law or bloodshed and tyranny.

All this work allows the “reason and justice” to stand on its own, defined only as the negative of violence, the negative of unfairness, bias, and fraudulence. This fundamental distinction was then built upon to ultimately reach the conclusion that the highest order of humanity is to be found in free trade. As seen in the drama of arbitrating boundaries, debts and ownership rights of the era, civilization and law were not separable from the benevolently-perceived role of capital in the quest for betterment of humanity. The banality of horror and the ridiculous, lawless, and animalistic behavior of the Other set the stage for the unobjectionable intervention of the U.S. on behalf of Venezuela. This intervention was rarely presented as direct meddling or use of colonial force, but rather was understood as a neutral and fair mediation between helpless Venezuela and its European bullies. In this understanding, the U.S. acted as a channel for Others to establish rights and responsibilities in authorized, legitimate legal documents. Only then could the fair and impartial relationships of commerce and free exchange take root.

Moreover, and this is an interesting distinction from the colonial discourse of Europe, the emergence of the U.S. as global superpower was also predicated on subordinating European mercantilist and imperial systems as a less sophisticated and

immoral form of government. The universal hierarchical order polices and regulates all nations, with the U.S. positioned as the naturally evolved leader – the fittest morally, politically, economically and technologically to take charge of global relationships.

As Europeans learned lessons of the morality of liberty, Venezuelans learned lessons of business and financial wisdom, and the U.S. lead the way to prosperity, growth, progress and mechanical efficiency. The fraudulence, piracy, greed and predatory nature that the *Times* so colorfully and metaphorically identified in Venezuela left a massive void for U.S. civilization – the assumed opposite of all these undesirable qualities – to fill with frictionless, virtuous and contractual modernization.

Shifting Focus to Political Structures

Establishing the legal structure for political and economic relations between the U.S. and Venezuela occurred during the reign of dictators that held power for the first half of the twentieth century. Increasing resistance to these reigns required a hegemonic shift in political structure in Venezuela. The commanding view of *The New York Times* followed suit, demanding and ensuring moderate democratic reform at the expense of revolutionary economic overhaul. By the late 1930s, the discursive battle to establish legal confidence in the mining contracts between U.S. companies and Venezuela had been won. Standard Oil and Shell collectively controlled 85 per cent of oil extraction in Venezuela; the moderate democrat Betancourt promised to maintain the established structures of power in exchange for a larger Venezuelan share in the oil profits, so the threat of nationalization was diminished (Coronil, 1997). Thus, the late 1950s and 1960s proved to be a “friendly” period between the U.S. and Venezuela, especially in the midst of the Cuban revolution and its Soviet implications.

All of this background information was characterized in the *Times* as a vague “journey” for Venezuelans out of the dark ages of pre-modern dictatorship and into civilized modern life. This was the same linear journey as told by the “chapters” and “pages of history” of the previous era of editorials. Through metaphors of nature and violence, the “brutal and predatory” nature of dictatorship was equated with Communist resistance, creating an anachronistic category of government that enveloped both. The equation of a Venezuelan Communist resistance that never came to power with the previous centuries of colonialism and dictatorial caudillos performed two tasks at once: it reinforced the colonialist understanding of the Venezuelan lack of history, politics and economics and also denied all possibilities for the future apart from civilized commerce and political reform. As the *Times* argued, no one wanted the “clock” to be turned back to the days of violence and lawlessness – even if it were *possible* to turn back time – when Venezuelans could look forward to heartwarming international friendship and modernization made in the Western image. Again, we have the either/or distinction between bloodshed and law, only now the concepts of civic politics and friendship complemented the representation of law as a rejection of violence.

The dramatic climax denoted the emergence of Venezuela into the realm of civilization as democratic consensus triumphed over the barbarity of infighting. The hopes of humanity for freedom and democracy were pinned on this climax. Were the Latin Americans civil or barbaric? Was the Other ready for self-rule (self-colonization)? The valiant centrist Rómulo Betancourt, with the help of President Kennedy and Senator Rockefeller, seemed to make the case for the *Times* that Venezuelans were finally ready to emerge from non-history into the history of the West. The native preference for democracy was understood as a preference for civilization that in turn was understood as

a preference for U.S. investment. The ultimate destination for this “uphill” Venezuelan journey was defined by the *Times* as modern economic standards and efficiency, most importantly institutionalized as a slow, stable, and moderate process. The industries, schools, roads, housing and public projects demanded by the “masses” could only be implemented through the slow, gradual process of capital investment. Only capital had the best interests of the Venezuelans at heart. The goal for Venezuelan democracy, for the *Times*, was to ensure the stability necessary for investments to do their work. Much like the job of dictators.

Completing the Project with Economic Rationality

By 1989, the legal structures necessary to protect international capital and the political structures to legitimate it had long been established in Venezuela. It was now time, according to the dictates of world financial organizations, to implement the economic structures in Latin America that would fully liberate the capital necessary to raise all boats. The majority of Venezuelans, however, still poor after decades of oil wealth and democracy, did not seem to understand the benevolent intentions of international capital and U.S. free-trade policy. They rioted in the streets when their president tried to impose the World Bank’s austerity measures at the expense of his adamant campaign promises to the opposite. Later indicting the same president on corruption charges, the people began to mobilize along alternative party lines. Eventually, Hugo Chávez was elected as the first socialist president of Venezuela in 1998 and has maintained a wide majority of electoral support among Venezuelans since, combating U.S. influence in the Latin American region.

How did the *Times* assess and analyze these political and economic changes in Venezuela and their implications for the U.S.? Unfortunately, as is shown above, it

emphasized much of the same colonialist assumptions identified in earlier eras, with various new metaphors and others dusted off and re-packaged. Contrary to the hopes of the civilized world, the Venezuelans' barbarity proved difficult to eradicate. Corruption and protectionism had squandered the wealth as well as opportunity for Venezuela's one valuable natural resource, and democracy failed to distribute oil wealth more fairly due to *too much* political consensus. This was, of course, understood as a failure of Venezuelans to rule themselves wisely, invoking therapeutic metaphors in the editorials that hinted of too much independence too soon for the developing nation. Much like a teenager would, given the neglect of attention from a wiser and more experienced role model, poor Venezuelans felt like "neglected stepchildren" and unwisely chased after trendy and fashionable populist rhetoric at the expense of their long-term well-being. The resulting corruption and waste was not the result of international financial structures that cripple Venezuelan attempts to diversify the economy beyond oil and encourage rent-capturing instead (Coronil, 1997), but rather was the result of the ignorance, weakness and self-victimization of Venezuelans and of the heart of darkness that the physical material of oil naturally evokes in mankind.

The *Times* imagines the situation in Venezuela as a reversion to an antiquated state of nature, wherein humans fail to control the barbarity of both external nature and their own and capitulate to a self-destructive anachronism that is not only as regressive as dictatorship but "destined to fail" as well. As an anachronism, the leftist resurgence in Latin America is by definition the antithesis of modernization. As the jungle steals back in to destroy modern life in Venezuela, crony capitalists (evoking the image of pirates used in the previous eras) anachronistically hoard their booty in the form of "cash" or

“arms,” and only Westernized nations and institutions are in a position to demand an end to the lawlessness, corruption or bribery.

What all this obscures is twofold: that “crony capitalism” is no less rampant within the U.S. than without, and that this outcome is the *direct* result of law, order and civilization as promoted by the *Times* and established by U.S. governments and companies. It is not a reversion, but rather part of the same evolution. The scenario heralded as truth by the *Times*, however, allows us to imagine a distinct boundary between Our community as self-made and virtuous and Theirs as barbaric and diseased, when no such boundary actually exists.

The emergent metaphorical understanding of an epidemic of populism in need of a Washington “economic prescription” links with the understanding of the hemisphere as a neighborhood to reproduce and engage the fear of contamination that seems quite characteristic of this era. In the more recent editorials, much less than those of the previous two eras *in this case*, an overwhelming concern was not only to save the barbarians from themselves by “strengthening judicial systems” and “developing new export industries” – concerns consistent throughout the century – but also now to save ourselves from the barbarians. With a very modernist sense of anxiety and loss, and in the most neutral, impartial and professional terms available, the *Times* described a crippling, desperate, polarized and violent antagonism that is spreading throughout the neighborhood, eating away at the pillars of civilization. This imagined positioning of the U.S. as an island in a sea of chaos and violence is an incredibly powerful form of knowledge, especially as taken for granted by *The New York Times*, one of the more powerful knowledge-making institutions in the world. It arguably triggers a defense

mechanism in US that reacts aggressively to quell the aggression that has been caused, in large part, by our previous acts of aggressive intervention.

News Discourse and International Structures of Power

Dominant histories of Western development incessantly maintain “that modernity is the offspring of a self-propelled West” (Coronil, 1997, p. 7) and that capitalism is “a self-generated system that expands from active modern regions and engulfs passive traditional societies” (p. 8). This ritualistic repetition obscures the complex reality that actually takes place, not to mention the historical impossibility of a West by itself. As seen in this ideological analysis of the *Times*, the national imagining of the U.S. as a benevolent leader at the peak of civilization reproduces and reinforces our demand that other nations of the world follow our lead and modernize or risk backwardness and underdevelopment. In terms of Venezuelan history, what this imagining obscures are the hybridity and mutual dependence of modernization and exploitation. What ends up happening in nations such as Venezuela, according to Coronil, is a proliferation of “subaltern modernities.” Venezuela’s history reminds us that:

The collusion between foreign oil companies and a regional caudillo brought together the most dynamic corporations of the capitalist world and the most characteristic form of rule in nineteenth century Latin America. As in many other instances in Latin America’s history, the paradoxical result of the region’s engagement with modernity was to reinforce practices and institutions considered to be traditional but which were the transcultural product of previous exchanges between European and American cultures. (Coronil, 1997, p. 83)

The amnesia of the always-already hybridity described by Coronil’s study of Venezuela is essential to the discursive work of exclusion, or Othering, that is itself essential to nation-building. The severance of the historical lineage of asymmetrical relations of power allows us to imagine a boundary and distinct histories that release the

West from a sense of responsibility. The imagining and forgetting taking place here is popularized by journalism to the point of invisibility by identifying a modern metropolitan center and a pre-modern periphery. The distinction, however, has never existed. They are two parts of the same process of modernization.

Today, the relationship between international capital and Venezuela demands that Venezuelans relinquish “a ‘fantasy’ world of petroleum wealth” in favor of “the ‘real’ world of the market” (Coronil, p. 391). This demand, according to Coronil, is a hegemonic force that corresponds to the increasingly abstract fetishism of money and finance and the institutionalization of debt crisis and economic rationality. From dictator to unified democracy to depersonalized global money, the *Times* has consistently demanded that Venezuela emerge from an imaginary periphery into an imaginary modernity. The force of these demands and their rationality alter our historical understanding of ourselves and our place in the world, and these leaps of imagination work to maintain the dominant structures of power.

Suggestions for Further Research

This is a predominantly exploratory analysis, as not much work has been done in this area of journalism studies. Further research of various cases in various sources of journalism would refine and complicate what I have found here. This would perhaps especially be the case if journalism in the three continents is analyzed and compared to the findings in the U.S. Moreover, this study was limited in its ability to identify and theorize modes of discourse that are resistant to colonialist understandings. Further research should function with this goal in mind in order that we may not only criticize old understandings but also, carefully, identify new ones.

APPENDIX

Cited Articles from *The New York Times*

Colonial

1897

A page of history. (1897, February 4), p. 6.

The Venezuela report. (1897, March 3), p. 6.

1898

Andrade's refuge. (1898, November 6), p. 6.

1899

Venezuela and Alaska. (1899, October 7), p. 6.

The Venezuela arbitration. (1899, October 5), p. 6.

The victory at Paris. (1899, October 4), p. 8.

1901

A chapter of American history. (1901, July 10), p. 6.

The new canal treaty. (1901, July 19), p. 6.

The trouble in Venezuela. (1901, January 18), p. 6.

1902

Arbitration for Venezuela. (1902, December 13), p. 8.

At war with Venezuela. (1902, December 18), p. 8.

Blockade and arbitration. (1902, December 21), p. 6.

British and German policy. (1902, December 12), p. 8.

The case of Venezuela. (1902, December 10), p. 8.

Coercing Venezuela. (1902, December 5), p. 8.

Coming to an agreement. (1902, December 20), p. 8.

The Hague tribunal. (1902, December 25), p. 6.

Justice and progress. (1902, December 30), p. 8.

Mr. Roosevelt as arbitrator. (1902, December 23), p. 8.

A pacific settlement. (1902, December 16), p. 8.

Venezuela. (1902, December 11), p. 8.

1903

End of the Venezuelan mess. (1903, February 15), p. 6.

The German way. (1903, January 23), p. 8.

The muddle in Venezuela. (1903, March 23), p. 8.

A near view of Castro. (1903, February 19), p. 8.

No entangling alliances. (1903, February 1), p. 6.

The path of peace. (1903, February 10), p. 8.

The Venezuelan "mess." (1903, February 15), p. 6.

1904

Anglo-American arbitration. (1904, January 11), p. 6.

Venezuela again. (1904, August 2), p. 6.

The Venezuelan award. (1904, February 23), p. 6.

We build a glass house. (1904, January 21), p. 8.

1905

Castro and the powers. (1905, March 22), p. 8.

France and Venezuela. (1905, March 19), p. 8.

Un president de boheme. (1905, September 11), p. 6.

Venezuela. (1905, June 21), p. 6.

Venezuela and Santo Domingo. (1905, March 26), p. 8.

1906

Castro and France. (1906, January 20), p. 8.

Lawmakers and lawbreakers. (1906, July 3), p. 8.

The Venezuelan porcupine. (1906, February 1), p. 8.

1907

Editorial. (1907, January 20), p. 6.

1908

Holland and Venezuela. (1908, December 15), p. 8.

Venezuela. (1908, December 24), p. 6.

The Venezuela botheration. (1908, April 2), p. 6.

Cold War

1958

Democracy at work. (1958, February 26), p. 26.

Democracy in Venezuela. (1958, September 4), p. 28.

Lull in Venezuela. (1958, January 16), p. 28.

Opportunity in Venezuela. (1958, November 3), p. 36.

Unwelcome guest. (1958, March 18), p. 28.

Venezuela is saved again. (1958, September 9), p. 34.

The Venezuelan campaign. (1958, November 19), p. 36.

Venezuela's election. (1958, December 10), p. 38.

Venezuela's triumph. (1958, January 24), p. 22.

Writing on the wall. (1958, January 10), p. 22.

A Yankee in South America. (1958, November 21), p. 28.

1959

Venezuela's new president. (1959, February 14), p. 20.

Venezuela's fruitful year. (1959, December 7), p. 30.

1960

Venezuela stands firm. (1960, April 24), p. E8.

The Venezuelan plots. (1960, September 14), p. 42.

1961

At journey's end. (1961, December 19), p. 32.

Flare-up in Venezuela. (1961, June 27), p. 32.

Latin-American trip. (1961, December 17), p. E8.

More trouble in Venezuela. (1961, February 21), p. 34.

President Kennedy's trip. (1961, December 13), p. 42.

1962

A Glance at Venezuela. (1962, January 27), p. 20.

Ferment in Venezuela. (1962, May 9), p. 40.

1963

The man from Caracas. (1963, February 19), p. 6.

Terror in Venezuela. (1963, November 30), p. 22.

Victory in Venezuela. (1963, December 3), p. 42.

1964

Venezuelan succession. (1964, March 10), p. 36.

1965

The Moscow-Caracas plot. (1965, April 17), p. 18.

Tragedy in Venezuela. (1965, February 22), p. 20.

1967

Latin democrats in crisis. (1967, November 17), p. 46.

O.A.S. dilemma on Cuba. (1967, September 24), p. 214.

1968

Venezuela expands. (1968, September 12), p. 46.

Current

1998

Venezuela's electoral revolt. (1998, December 8), p. A26.

1999

Emergence of a Venezuelan potentate. (1999, August 21), p. A12.

2000

The ambitions of Hugo Chávez. (2000, November 6), p. A38.

Consolidating power in Venezuela. (2000, August 2), p. A24.

The petro-curse. (2000, July 31), p. A18.

2001

Containing Colombia's troubles. (2001, January 15), p. A14.

The selling of free trade. (2001, April 24), p. A18.

2002

A beleaguered hemisphere. (2002, November 22), p. A26.

Hugo Chávez departs. (2002, April 13), p. A16.

Latin America's muzzled press. (2002, April 4), p. A22.

Venezuela on the brink. (2002, December 18), p. A34.

Venezuela's political turbulence. (2002, April 16), p. A26.

2003

Backtracking on Mexico. (2003, January 11), p. A14.

Making oil transparent. (2003, July 6), p. A8.

Preserving democracy in Venezuela. (2003, January 24), p. 22.

Turmoil in the Andes. (2003, March 12), p. A24.

2004

Brazil's moment. (2004, January 24), p. A14.

Hugo Chávez wins. (2004, August 18), p. A22.

Latin America's half-term presidents. (2004, February 26), p. 26.

A recall vote in Venezuela. (2004, June 10), p. A28.

2005

A different Latin America. (2005, December 24), p. A16.

Free trade begins at home. (2005, November 5), p. A16.

Hugo Chávez and his helpers. (2005, December 10), p. A14.

Judgment malfunction. (2005, August 25), p. A22.

President Bush's walkabout. (2005, November 8), p. A26.

2006

Beyond the slogans in Latin America. (2006, January 10), p. A24.

Mexico's election. (2006, June 19), p. A18.

Peru's looming disaster. (2006, May 3), p. A24.

2007

Thanks to Mr. Chávez. (2007, March 7), p. A20.

Venezuela Inc.'s hostile takeover. (2007, January, 10), p. A22.

REFERENCES

- Adelman, J. (2002, November). Andean impasses. *New Left Review*, 18, 41-72.
- Althusser, L. (1971). Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses. In *Lenin and philosophy and other essays* (B. Brewster, Trans.). New York: Monthly Review.
- Anderson, B. (1991). *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism* (2nd ed.). New York: Verso.
- Bailey, Olga. (2005). Journalism and the 'Politics of Naming' the Other. Paper presented at the meeting of the International Communication Association, New York.
- Barthes, R. (1972). *Mythologies* (A. Lavers, Trans.). New York: Hill & Wang. (Original work published in 1957)
- Bennett, W. (1990). Toward a theory of press-state relations in the United States. *Journal of Communication*, 40(2), 103-125.
- Berger, A. (1998). *Media research techniques* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Berry, N. (1990). *Foreign policy and the press: An analysis of The New York Times' coverage of U.S. foreign policy*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
- Bhabha, H. (1994). *The location of culture*. New York: Routledge.
- Campbell, J. (2004). 1897. *Journalism History*, 29, 190-200.
- Carey, J. (1988). *Communication as culture*. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
- Carragee, K. (1993). A critical evaluation of debates examining the media hegemony thesis. *Western Journal of Communication*, 57, 330-348.
- Carragee, K. (2003). Evaluating polysemy: An analysis of *The New York Times'* coverage of the end of the Cold War. *Political Communication*, 20, 287-308.
- Chakrabarty, D. (2000). *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial thought and historical difference*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Cohen, B. (1963). *The press and foreign policy*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
- Coppedge, M. (1994). *Strong parties and lame ducks: Presidential partyarchy and factionalism in Venezuela*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Coronil, F. (1997). *The magical state: Nature, money and modernity in Venezuela*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Delacour, J. (2005, June 1). Framing Venezuela: U.S. media's anti-Chávez bias. *Counterpunch*. Retrieved November 28, 2006, from <http://www.counterpunch.org/delacour06012005.html>
- Dijk, T. van. (1998). *Ideology: A multidisciplinary approach*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Drzewiecka, J. (2003). Collective memory, media representations, and barriers to intercultural dialogue. In M. Collier (Ed.), *Intercultural alliances: Critical transformation* (pp. 189-219). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Ellner, S., & Hellinger, D. (Eds.). (2003). *Venezuelan politics in the Chávez era: Class, polarization and conflict*. Bolder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Ellner, S. (2003). Introduction: The search for explanation. In S. Ellner, & D. Hellinger (Eds.), *Venezuelan politics in the Chávez era: Class, polarization and conflict* (pp. 7-26). Bolder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Entman, R. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. *Journal of Communication*, 43(4), 51-58.
- Ewell, J. (1996). *Venezuela and the United States: From Monroe's hemisphere to petroleum's empire*. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.
- Fairclough, N. (1989). *Language and power*. London: Longman.
- Fowler, R. (1996). On critical linguistics. In C. Caldas-Coulthard, & M. Coulthard (Eds.), *Texts and practices: Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis* (pp. 3-14). London: Routledge.
- Frosh, P., & Wolfsfeld, G. (2006). ImagiNation: News discourse, nationhood and civil society. *Media, Culture & Society*, 29, 105-129.
- Gamson, W., & Modigliani, A. (1989). Media discourse and public opinion on nuclear power: A constructionist approach. *American Journal of Sociology*, 95, 1-37.
- Ghafele, R. (2004). The metaphors of globalization and trade: An analysis of the language used in the WTO. *Journal of Language & Politics*, 3, 357-370.
- Gitlin, T. (1980). *The whole world is watching: Mass media in the making and unmaking of the New Left*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Golinger, E. (2007, January 13). Confused about Venezuela? *Venezuelanalysis*. Retrieved March 11, 2007, from <http://venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1933#top>
- Gott, R. (2005). *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution* (2nd ed.). New York: Verso.

- Gramsci, A. (1971). *Selections from the prison notebooks of Antonio Gramsci* (Q. Hoare & G. Smith, Eds. & Trans.). New York: International.
- Habermas, J. (1989). *The structural transformation of the public sphere* (T. Burger, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Original work published in 1963)
- Hall, S. (1980). Encoding/decoding. In S. Hall, et al. (Eds.), *Culture, media, language: Working papers in cultural studies, 1972-1979* (pp. 128-138). London: Hutchinson.
- Hall, S. (1982). The rediscovery of ideology: Return of the repressed in media studies. In Gurevitch, M., et al. (Eds.), *Culture, society and the media*. New York: Methuen.
- Hall, S. (1986). Gramsci's relevance for the study of race and ethnicity. *Journal of Communication Inquiry*, 10, 5-27.
- Hallin, D. (1986). *The "uncensored" war: The media and Vietnam*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Hellinger, D. (2003). Political overview: The breakdown of *Puntofijismo*. In S. Ellner, & D. Hellinger (Eds.), *Venezuelan politics in the Chávez era: Class, polarization and conflict* (pp. 27-54). Bolder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Herman, E. (1985). Diversity of News. *Journal of Communication*, 35, 135-146.
- Herman, E., & Chomsky, N. (1988). *Manufacturing consent: A political economy of the mass media*. New York: Pantheon.
- Hillman, R. (1994). *Democracy for the privileged: Crisis and transition in Venezuela*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Iskandar, A. (2005). On Orientalism: Edward Said, Representation, and the Post-Structural Epistemology of Power. Paper presented at the meeting of the International Communication Association, New York.
- Jones, P., & Collins, C. Analysis of discourse as "a form of history writing": A critique of Critical Discourse Analysis and an illustration of a cultural-historical alternative. *Atlantic Journal of Communication*, 14, 51-69.
- Keever, S. (2006, August). Persisting patterns: A framing analysis of *The New York Times'* coverage of Venezuelan politics, 2001-2005. Paper presented at the meeting of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, San Francisco, CA.
- Kellner, D. (1995). *Media and culture*. New York: Routledge.
- Laclau, E. (1993). Discourse. In R. Goodin & P. Pettit (Eds.), *A companion to contemporary political philosophy* (pp. 431-437). Malden, MA: Blackwell.

- Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). *Metaphors we live by*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lalander, R. (1998). *Decentralization and political opportunities in Venezuela: New actors and arenas for the political game, 1989-1997*. Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm University, Institute of Latin American Studies.
- Landers, J. (2006). Island empire: Discourse on U.S. imperialism in Century, Cosmopolitan, and McClure's, 1893-1900. *American Journalism*, 23, 95-124.
- Larson, J., McAnany, E., & Storey, J. (1986). News of Latin America on network television, 1972-1981: A northern perspective on the southern hemisphere. *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, 3, 169-183.
- Lazar, A. & Lazar, M. (2004). The discourse of the New World Order: "Outcasting" the double face of threat. *Discourse & Society*, 15, 223-242.
- Le, E. (2006). Collective memories and representations of national identity in editorials. *Journalism Studies*, 7, 708-728.
- Lippmann, W. (1965). *Public Opinion*. New York: Free Press. (Original work published in 1922)
- Lombardi, J. (2003). Prologue: Venezuela's permanent dilemma. In S. Ellner, & D. Hellinger (Eds.), *Venezuelan politics in the Chávez era: Class, polarization and conflict* (pp. 1-6). Bolder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1970). *The German ideology*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- McNelly, J. & Izcaray, F. (1992). International news exposure and images of nations. *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, 63, 546-553.
- Molina-Gúzman, I. (2003). The symbolic colonization of hybrid bodies through popular narratives of Latinidad. Paper presented at the meeting of the International Communication Association, San Diego, CA.
- Mouffe, C. (1979). Hegemony and ideology. In C. Mouffe (Ed.), *Gramsci and Marxist theory* (pp. 168-204). London: Routledge.
- Paletz, D. & Entman, R. (1981). *Media power politics*. New York: Free Press.
- Parameswaran, R. (2002). Local culture in global media: Excavating colonial and material discourses in National Geographic. *Communication Theory*, 12, 287-315.
- Patke, R. (2006). Postcolonial cultures. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 23, 369-372.

- Reese, S., Gandy, O., & Grant, A. (Eds.). (2001). *Framing public life: Perspectives on media and our understanding of the social world*. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Roberts, K. (2003). Social polarization and the populist resurgence in Venezuela. In S. Ellner, & D. Hellinger (Eds.), *Venezuelan politics in the Chávez era: Class, polarization and conflict* (pp. 55-72). Bolder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Rodriguez, Ilia. (1998). News reporting and colonial discourse: The representation of Puerto Ricans in U.S. press coverage of the Spanish-American war. *Howard Journal of Communications*, 9, 283-301.
- Rosenblum, M. (1979). *Coups and earthquakes: Reporting the world for America*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Said, E. (1978). *Orientalism*. New York: Pantheon.
- Salwen, M. & Matera, F. (1989). Public salience of foreign nations. *Journalism Quarterly*, 69, 623-632.
- Santa Ana, O. (2002). *Brown tide rising: Metaphors of Latinos in contemporary American public discourse*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- Schön, D. (1979). Generative metaphor: A perspective on problem-setting in social policy. In A. Ortony (Ed.), *Metaphor and thought* (pp. 137-163). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Schudson, M. (1994). Culture and the integration of national societies. In Crane, D. (Ed.), *The sociology of culture: Emerging theoretical perspectives* (pp. 21-43). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Semetko, H., Brzinski, J., Weaver, D. & Willnat, L. (1992). TV news and U.S. public opinion about foreign countries: The impact of exposure and attention. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 4, 18-36.
- Shome, R., & Hedge, R. (2002). Postcolonial approaches to communication: Charting the terrain, engaging the intersections. *Communication Theory*, 12, 249-270.
- Sigal, L. (1973). *Reporters and officials: The organization and politics of newsmaking*. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath.
- Spivak, G. (1987). *In Other worlds: Essays in cultural politics*. New York: Methuen.
- Spurr, D. (1993). *Rhetoric of Empire: Colonial discourse in journalism, travel writing, and imperial administration*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Thompson, J. (1990). *Ideology and Modern Culture*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

- Wanta, W., Golan, G., & Lee, C. Agenda Setting and international news: Media influence on public perceptions of foreign nations. *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, 81, 364-377.
- Wanta, W., & Hu, Y. (1993). The agenda-setting effects of international news coverage: An examination of differing news frames. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 5, 250-264.
- Weisbrot, M., & Chávez, H. (2003, December 2). Interviewing Chávez. *ZNet*. Retrieved June 21, 2006, from <http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=4594>
- Weiss, C. (1974). What America's leaders read. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 38, 1-22.
- Young, R. (2001). *Postcolonialism: An historical introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell.

The vita has been removed from the reformatted version of this document.